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INTRODUCTION
After years of relatively somnambulant existence, corpora-
tion law has awakened to the tune of major movements.' A ma-
jor movement in the United States is the American Bar
Association's Committee on Corporate Laws' monumental pro-
ject to review and restate in its entirety the authoritative Model
Business Corporation Act.2 Another effort by an authoritative
source in the United States is the American Law Institute
(ALI) Principles of Corporate Governance and Structure: Re-
1. In part the awakening has been foreshadowed by sometimes shrill and
nonauthoritative criticism and proposals initiated by groups outside the corpo-
rate establishment, such as a Nader group's campaign for federal chartering of
corporations. See, e.g., R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, CoNsTrrurrONAuZ-
ING THE CORPORATION: THE CASE FOR FEDERAL CHARTERING OF GIANT CORPORA-
TIONS (1976); R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT
CORPORATION (1976).
2. The Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) first appeared in 1950.
In 1960, the MBCA Annotated appeared. The MBCA Annotated Second was
published in 1971, and, as amended, is the version currently in use and cited
herein, MBCA (1979). MBCA Third, or the REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORPORA-
TION ACT (Exposure Draft 1983) (RMA), was published for comment in March
1983. See Goldstein & Hamilton, The Revised Model Business Corporation Act,
39 Bus. LAW. 1019 (1983). The RMA is the work product of the Committee on
Corporate Laws of the Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law of
the American Bar Association. Robert W. Hamilton, Schmidt Professor of Law
at the University of Texas, served as reporter for the project.
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statement and Recommendations,3 the ALI's initial foray into
corporation law.4 In Great Britain, Parliament has enacted
Companies Acts in 1967, 1976, 1980, and 1981, all amending the
basic statute, Companies Act 1948.5 Company law is said to be
"in greater disarray than at any time since the beginning of the
century-both in content and in form." 6
All three of these corporation law movements proceed in
distinctly different directions. Moreover, each movement
marches on with little or no awareness of what is occurring in
the other spheres. Most importantly, all seemingly proceed on
the basis of "buzz word" philosophies and without clear
thought about what goals they seek to achieve or what roles
corporation law should play.7
In both the United States and Great Britain commentators
have made little effort to distill the trend of corporation law.
Instead, discussions of corporation law frequently involve ex-
cessive examination of controversial and radical proposals,
such as federal chartering in the United States and worker par-
ticipation in corporate governance in Europe.8
The goal of this Article is to divine, from legislation and
other authoritative sources, the directions in which corporation
and company law actually have proceeded in the last two de-
cades. 9 The last extensive comparison of American corporation
and British company law was made by Professor L.C.B. Gower
3. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GovERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 1 1982) [hereinafter cited as CoRpo-
RATE GOVERNANCE].
4. The American Law Institute (ALI) has produced a restatement in the
related securities law area. FEDERAL SECUmRTIES CODE (1980).
5. See L.C.B. GOWER, PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 56-57 (4th ed.
1979 & Supp. 1981).
6. Id. at 56. See also Gower, Whither Company Law? 15 U. BRrr. COLUM.
L REV. 385 (1981).
7. See infra notes 318-24 and accompanying text.
8. As to federal chartering, see supra note 1. On so-called codetermina-
tion, the sources are numerous. See, e.g., Corporate Social Responsibility Sym-
posium, 30 HASTINGS L J. 1247, 1413-63 (1979); Gorton, Employee Participation
in Swedish Company Law, 1975 J. Bus. L. 163; Sanders, Employee Participa-
tion in the Netherlands, 1977 J. Bus. L. 209; Vagts, Reforming the "Modern" Cor-
poration: Perspectives from the German, 80 HARv. L. REV. 23 (1966). The
British white paper on industrial democracy, the Bullock Report, CMND 6706
(1977), is reviewed in the ECONOMIST, Feb. 12, 1977, at 109-110 & Feb. 19, 1977, at
103-04.
9. Insofar as recent British enactments reflect harmonization of company
law within the European Community, an exposition on company law changes
reflects trends in Europe generally. See, e.g., LC.B. GowER, supra note 5, at 75-
93; Berger, Harmonization of Company Law Under the Common Market Treaty,
4 CREIGHTON L. REV. 205 (1971); Schmitthoff, The Impact of European Commu-
nity Law on English Law, 8 MANrOBA L. J. 461 (1977).
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in 1956.10 Against the backdrop of corporation and company
law developments over the past three decades, this Article dis-
cusses a third trend, the ALI Principles of Corporate Govern-
ance and Structure: Restatement and Recommendations.
Analyzing all three trends makes clear that there exists a
dearth of fresh thought on a philosophy of corporation law or
about what ends corporation law reform should seek to
achieve.
I. THE TRADITIONAL AMERICAN CORPORATION LAW
MODEL AND THE TREND OF VARIATION
FROM IT
Based upon the concession theory, American corporation
law has traditionally been restrictive. A fictional entity, a cor-
poration had only those powers conceded to it by the state."
In the past three decades, however, many American jurisdic-
tions have moved away from restrictive toward consensual or
enabling views, especially with regard to small, closely held
corporations.12
Even before this change, Justice Brandeis stated that some
key American commercial states engaged in a race "not of dili-
gence but of laxity" for the benefit of large as well as small cor-
porations.13 In competition for incorporations within their
borders, these states tried to "out-Delaware Delaware."' 4 In a
few states, the philosophy of regulation was to impose as few
controls as possible, allowing corporations to obtain the privi-
leges of corporate existence 5 without any corresponding bur-
10. Gower, Some Contrasts Between British and American Corporation
Law, 69 HARv. L. REV. 1369 (1956).
11. "A corporation is a creature existing, not by contract; but, in this
country, is created or authorized by statute; and its rights, and even
modes of action, may be, and generally are, defined and marked out by
statute; and where they are, they can not be changed, even by the con-
tracts of the corporators."
Ohio Ins. Co. v. Nunnemacher, 15 Ind. 294, 295 (1860).
12. See Cary, How Illinois Corporations May Enjoy Partnership Advan-
tages: Planning for the Closely Held Firm; 48 Nw. U.L. REv. 427 (1953); Hall, The
New Maryland Close Corporation Law, 27 MD. L. REV. 341 (1967); Israels, The
Close Corporation and the Law, 33 CORNELL L. Q. 488 (1948); O'Neal, Develop-
ments in the Regulation of the Close Corporation, 50 CORNELL L. Q. 641 (1965).
13. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 559 (1933) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
14. As late as 1972, in Michigan's adoption of a laissez-faire corporation
law, tq "out-Delaware Delaware" was the drafters' avowed aim. See Downs,
Michigan to Have a New Corporation Code?, 18 WAYNE L. REV. 913, 914 (1972).
15. The privileges of corporate existence include perpetual life, unlimited
accumulation of property, and limited liability. See R. HAMILTON, CORPORA-
TIONS 9-20 (2d ed. 1981).
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dens. It was, in effect, no philosophy at all.16 That state of the
law was extensively noted, and even satirized, years ago. 7 .
About the time that Professor Gower' 8 compared American
and British corporation laws, and for some years thereafter,
however, thirty-five to forty other American states remained in
the middle of the restrictive-to-enabling spectrum.19 Those
states retained requirements from which corporations could
not vary or, in permitting variations from the model the statute
envisioned, set relatively high minimum standards.20 Those
corporation statutes had substantive content; they contained
affirmative commands and definite prohibitions.21 Through
their corporation laws these states attempted to retain at least
a modicum of shareholder, if not creditor, protection and to
hold corporate directors and officers to relatively high stan-
dards of conduct and procedure. Flexibility had not yet be-
come supreme.
A. BEGINNING REVISION IN THE UNITED STATES
In the 1960s the march of American state corporation law
became a march toward uniformity. The Model Business Cor-
poration Act (MBCA) became the dominant state corporation
law, spreading from sixteen states in 1966 to thirty-four in
1977.22 Moreover, many of those thirty-four states joined the
16. The late Professor William Cary concluded that there is "[p]erhaps
no public policy left in Delaware corporate law except the objective of rais-
ing revenue." Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Dela-
ware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 684 (1974). Of corporation law in general it has been
said that significant "rghts... once attributed to the shareholder interest...
have long since been sacrificed on the altar of corporate flexibility." Borden,
Going Private--Old Tort, New Tort or No Tort, 49 N.Y.U. L REV. 987, 1020-21
(1974).
17. See, e.g., Comment, Law for Sale: A Study of the Delaware Corpora-
tion Law of 1967, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 861 (1969) (evoking Cole Porter's lyrics),
and authorities discussed therein.
18. See infra note 96.
19. See Branson, Toward a Philosophy of Corporate Law, 1979 ARiz. ST. L.
J. 217, 231.
20. See, e.g., MBCA § 32 (unless otherwise provided, shareholder quorum
is a majority "but in no event shall a quorum consist of less than one third"); In
re Win. Faehndrich, Inc., 2 N.Y.2d 468, 141 N.E.2d 597, 161 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1957)
(higher quorum requirements struck down where found in bylaws rather than
articles).
21. See, e.g., MBCA §§ 19 ("Neither promissory notes nor future services
shall constitute payment or part payment for the issuance of shares."), 47 (cor-
poration may not lend money to directors absent shareholder authorization).
22. Compare G. SEwARD, BAsIC CORPORATE PRACTICE (1966) (sixteen
states) with G. SEwARD & W. NAuss, BASIc CORPORATE PRACTICE (2d ed. 1977)
(thirty-four states).
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MBCA, which had traditionally been a mildly restrictive, mid-
dle-of-the-road scheme, in casting their lot with the philosophy
of "enabling" and "flexibility."23
To illustrate the MBCA's course, it might behoove one to
compare today's treatment of a hypothetical transaction with
MBCA treatment of the same transaction some years ago.24 An
illustrative case might be the protection the Act gives to minor-
ity shareholders in cases involving the issuance of shares. As-
sume that those in control of a corporation with 10,000 shares
outstanding propose to authorize and issue 10,000 new shares
to friends or associates. The price is to be relatively attractive:
somewhat but not drastically below book value and, hence, in
the particular corporation, somewhat but not drastically out of
line with probable market value. A purpose of the issuance is
to dilute by one-half the minority share interest's voting power,
perhaps causing the minority to lose a directorship they had
been able to control through cumulative voting.
1. The Hypothetical Transaction Circa 1965
To increase the authorized shares the controlling share-
holders might first have had to amend the articles of incorpora-
tion at a shareholders' meeting. At the time the MBCA
required a quorum of at least a majority of shares present for
valid action to take place.25 At the meeting, for the amendment
to pass, two-thirds of the shares would have had to approve it.26
Even if the amendment were adopted and the shares duly
authorized, the directors would still have faced the issue of pre-
emptive rights. The MBCA provided that unless the articles of
incorporation expressly took them away preemptive rights still
existed in the corporation.27 The controlling shareholder-direc-
tors would then have had to give the minority shareholders an
opportunity to purchase pro rata portions of the proposed new
issuance, thus maintaining their proportionate voting and own-
23. The individual noting the MBCA's shift toward laissez faire was Pro-
fessor Melvin Eisenberg, School of Law, University of California-Berkeley.
See Eisenberg, The Model Business Corporation Act and the Model Business
Corporation Act Annotated, 29 Bus. LAw. 1407 (1974).
24. For comparative purposes, the current Washington Business Corpora-
tions Act, WASH. REV. CODE, §§ 23A.04.010-.98.030 (1974) will be used as a Model
Act of the older vintage. The Washington Act has not been substantially re-
vised in the last decade and is only now undergoing revision by a state bar
committee.
25. Id. § 23A.08.290.
26. Id. § 23A.16.020.
27. Id. § 23A.08.220.
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ership rights. If, however, for lack of financial wherewithal or
some other reason, the minority shareholders could not exer-
cise their preemptive rights, the controlling shareholders still
would not have been free to place shares in the friendly hands
of their associates.
Through the mid-1960s the MBCA left treatment of the
ever-present conflict-of-interest problem to case law.28 Thus, if
it appeared that directors were attempting to serve their own
interests or those of associates rather than the best interests of
the corporation, the three-pronged common law test applied.
First, the directors had to disclose their personal interests, the
interests of friends, associates, or persons controlled by the di-
rectors, and the corporation's interests in the proposed transac-
tion. Next, a majority of the disinterested directors, with
interested directors perhaps not even being counted for quo-
rum purposes, had to approve the transaction. If a quorum or
approval could not be obtained because of a number of direc-
tors being interested in the transaction, shareholder approval
might be necessary. Finally, even with full disclosure and the
vote of a majority of the disinterested directors, the transaction
would have had to have been fair to the corporation.29 Thus,
even beyond preemptive rights and other safeguards, the
fiduciary duty of loyalty would have been applicable to the di-
rectors' proposed issuance of shares, calculated as it was to
consolidate incumbent directors' control of the corporation.
Hence, in the 1960s and early 1970s, minority shareholders
threatened with dilution by a new issuance of shares had, as
plates of armor, several statutory and common law protections.
Any one of these protections would not have been a complete
safeguard, but together they formed a shield which the board of
directors or those otherwise in control of the corporation would
find difficult to penetrate.
2. The Hypothetical Transaction Today
Today under the MBCA the picture would be markedly dif-
28. Not until 1966 was a section on director conflict of interest added to the
MBCA. See MBCA § 41 comment at 842.
29. See generally id. at 842-44;, Bulbulia & Pinto, Statutory Responses to In-
terested Directors' Transactions: A Watering Doum of Fiduciary Standards, 53
NOTRE DAME LAw. 201, 203 (1977). In addition, fairness sometimes meant fair-
ness in operation as well as on the face of the transaction. Thus, directors and
their affiliates were subject to having their transactions judged with the tint of
hindsight. See Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Elec. Co., 224 N.Y. 483, 121 N.E.
378 (1918) (Cardozo, J.).
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ferent. The quorum for the meeting of shareholders to author-
ize new shares could be set as low as one-third of the shares,
3 0
giving an added opportunity for holders of mere working con-
trol to consolidate their position. Once the meeting had been
convened, a simple majority, rather than two-thirds, of shares
entitled to vote could amend the articles. 3 1
When faced with the issuance of new shares and potential
dilution, minority shareholders in the corporation might also
find that they no longer had preemptive rights. Today's MBCA
provides that "shareholders of a corporation shall have no pre-
emptive right" unless expressly granted by the articles of
incorporation.32
The shareholders might even find themselves without
power to challenge the issuance of shares to friends, associates,
or other sets of friendly hands. The MBCA has now codified
conflict-of-interest procedures 33 weaker than the common law
required, and perhaps so watered down that corporate officers'
and directors' duties no longer include any duty of loyalty. The
MBCA, like Delaware law, now provides that no act of directors
shall be void or voidable if disclosure has been made and if,
based upon disclosure, the disinterested directors approve the
transaction,34 interested directors being counted for quorum
purposes. Even if disclosure and approval have not taken
place, however, the MBCA provides that, alternatively, the
transaction will remain valid if "fair" to the corporation.35 The
old three-pronged common law test has been cut in two, mak-
ing it disjunctive-disclosure and vote or fairness will suffice.36
30. MBCA § 32.
31. MBCA § 59. See also supra note 23 and accompanying text. If the cor-
poration had implemented lower quorum requirements, only one-sixth (one-
half of one-third) of the shares could, in theory, take action short of organic
change such as merger or sale of assets. Thus, for example, one-sixth could ap-
prove transactions where a majority of directors are interested. MBCA §§ 32
(majority represented at meeting can take valid action), 41(b) (shareholder rat-
iflcation or authorization in conflict-of-interest situations). One-sixth might be
able to remove a director. MBCA §§ 32, 39 (removal by a majority entitled to
vote for the election of directors).
32. MBCA § 26.
33. MBCA § 41.
34. See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1967); MBCA § 41.
35. MBCA § 41.
36. Prominent authority reads state statutes as having that effect. See E.
Fouc, THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAw 82-86 (1972). But see Remil-
lard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini, 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 418, 241 P.2d 66, 74
(1952) (even though the statute's disclosure and vote requirements are met,
"transactions that are unfair and unreasonable to the corporation may be
avoided.").
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Fairness connotes as its opposite damage or a likelihood of
damage to the corporation. Thus, with fairness alone as the
touchstone, corporate officials' duty becomes merely a duty of
not harming the principal, rather than a duty of loyalty. At
common law, since the duty was one of loyalty, either damage
to the corporation or benefit to the agent could result in liabil-
ity.3 7 Moreover, regardless of whether the result was ulti-
mately "fair" to the corporation, the common law required
approval by disinterested directors in all cases in order to in-
culcate in the agent fidelity and obedience toward the
principal.38
In the hypothetical posited above, the minority would
charge that, through issuance of the shares, the directors seek
to serve their own interests rather than the corporation's inter-
ests. Under a fairness-alone conflict-of-interest analysis, as per-
mitted by the current MBCA, however, the tendency of courts
will be to look only at price. If the shares are issued at a price
which approximates market value, the issuance is fair to the
corporation. It is of little importance who receives the shares
or that the substantial benefit inures to those in control.3 9
The hypothetical just discussed provides a good illustration
of what flexibility means in a corporate statute, and demon-
37. "Fidelity in the agent" and not mere prevention of "injury... to the
corporation" is the law's supposed goal. State ex rel. Hayes Oyster Co. v. Key-
point Oyster Co., 64 Wash. 2d 375, 385, 391 P.2d 979, 985 (1964). Accord Brophy
v. Cities Service Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 246, 70 A.2d 5, 8 (1949). See also Diamond
v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 498, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912, 30 N.Y.S.2d 78, 81 (1969):
[An] allegation of damages to the corporation... has never been con-
sidered to be an essential requirement for a cause of action founded on
a breach of fiduciary duty. This is because the function of such an ac-
tion, unlike an ordinary tort or contract case, is not merely to compen-
sate the plaintiffs for wrongs committed ... but . . . "tc- prevent
[wrongs], by removing from agents and trustees all inducement to at-
tempt dealing for their own benefit in matters which they have under-
taken for others...."
(emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
38. Hence, regardless of fairness of the transaction itself, "nondisclosure"
by a corporate official of his or her conflict of interest was "itself unfair." Hayes
Oyster Co., 64 Wash. 2d at 382, 391 P.2d at 984. See also Marsh, Are Directors
Trustees? Conflicts of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22 Bus. LAw. 35 (1966).
39. In truth, even before the Model Act changes, courts gave varied treat-
ment to transactions such as the hypothetical posed. Compare Hyman v. Vel-
sicol Corp., 342 11. App. 489, 97 N.E.2d 122 (1951) (majority's intent to squeeze
out minority and to consolidate its own position is irrelevant if share price is
adequate and independent business purpose exists for the share issuance)
with Browning v. C & C Plywood Corp., 248 Or. 574, 434 P.2d 339 (1967) (intent
to squeeze minority is to be examined regardless of alternative purpose for the
stock issuance). The varied treatment courts have given to such cases even
with the presence of such safeguards may be a reason to retain or strengthen
those safeguards.
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strates the veer toward pro-management interests the MBCA
has taken. Other examples of those same two phenomena exist
in other sections of the MBCA.40 It becomes apparent from the
illustration that corporate law no longer has protection of
shareholders deeply at heart.41 In large part due to the MBCA,
the "enabling" or "consensual" philosophy now reigns supreme
in the corporation laws of almost every American state. Few af-
firmative commands or other substantive regulations remain.
Flexibility has become the talisman.
3. The Hypothetical Transaction Under The Revised Model
Act-More Flexibility for the Future
The proposed Revised Model Business Corporation Act
(RMA) has features which represent an improvement over
prior MBCA versions. The proposed statute's organization
alone is an improvement.42 Some of its substantive provisions,
as well, seem to provide workable, creative solutions, even in
an absolute sense.4 3
Even so, in order to evaluate the RMA, "you must," in Jus-
tice Holmes' words, "look at it as a bad man, who cares only for
the material consequences ... knowledge enables him to pre-
dict" and "not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct
... in the vaguer sanctions of conscience."44 The RMA's draft-
ers predicate the overwhelming majority of their revisions on a
need for yet more flexibility, and apparently find justification
for those revisions in notions of good faith, fiduciary duty, and
40. See, for example, the MBCA's possible relaxation of directors' duty of
care and allowance of increased delegation by directors of their functions,
MBCA §§ 35, 42, and the directors' and officers' nonexclusive indemnification
provision, MBCA § 5.
41. Nowhere has protection of shareholders given way to flexibility and
protection for management more than in state tender offer statutes. See, e.g.,
Langevoort, State Tender Offer Legislation: Interests, Effects and Political Com-
petency, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 213 (1977); Wysocld, To Stall Takeover Bids, Many
Companies Use Obscure New Statutes, Wall St. J., Nov. 19, 1975, at 1, col. 6. But
see Edgar v. Mite Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629 (1982) (illinois tender offer statute vio-
lates commerce clause).
42. MBCA lumps many of its important provisions into a lengthy chapter
entitled "Substantive Provisions." MBCA §§ 3-52. RMA adopts a functional,
chronological arrangement and, thus, there are discrete RMA chapters on In-
corporation (Ch. 2), Purpose and Powers (Ch. 3), Name (Ch. 4), Office and
Agent (Ch. 5), Shares and Distributions (Ch. 6), Shareholders (Ch. 7), Officers
and Directors (Ch. 8), and other corporations topics.
43. See, e.g., RMA § 13.01-.31 (a comprehensive and innovative approach to
dissenters' rights).
44. O.W. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 171
(1920).
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"the vaguer sanctions of conscience" in those to whom they
would entrust that flexibility.
In the hypothetical previously discussed, a corporation's di-
rectors propose to dilute by one-half a minority share interest's
voting power. If successful in diluting the minority interest, the
directors would perhaps cause the minority to lose a director-
ship which it had in the past been able to control through cu-
mulative voting. In a corporation formed under the RMA,
however, the directors may not even need to dilute the minor-
ity interest. The RMA eliminates presumptive cumulative vot-
ing, instead requiring articles of incorporation to take
affirmative steps to install cumulative voting.45
Cumulative voting promotes minority representation on
the board. It can also result in the election of directors who
perceive their task as representation of special interests the mi-
nority may have. Cumulative voting can thus result in fraction-
alism. Just as frequently, however, the presence of two or
three directors elected cumulatively can serve to stir up a com-
placent board of directors and management.4 6 Through the in-
teraction of cumulative voting, which promotes minority
representation, and state law provisions for staggered boards of
directors, which can eliminate representation for all but large
minority shareholders, 47 representation by minority holdings
with significant stakes is a frequent result of cumulative voting.
It is frequently a very constructive result in a corporation. The
RMA drafters sweep away even this limited protection for mi-
norities with no analysis whatsoever.46
Even assuming the existence of minority representatives to
eliminate, under the RMA the board of directors can act with a
quorum of as few as one-third, rather than the traditional ma-
jority.4 9 If, therefore, the directors need to preface the minor-
45. RMA § 7.28.
46. See, e.g., R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SECURTIES
REGULATION 1364-65 (5th ed. 1982) (note on inadvertent investment company
status in "special situation" and turnaround corporate situations).
47. See, e.g., W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ComoRA-
TIONS 254-61 (5th ed. 1981). For example, with a nine-person board, under cu-
mulative voting a minority of 11% plus could elect one director. When the
same board is staggered, for example, into three classes of directors with a
class of three elected each year for three-year terms, a minority must hold at
least a third of the shares to obtain representation, even though cumulative
voting still exists.
48. See RMA § 7.28 (eliminating cumulative voting with no analysis or
comment).
49. Compare MBCA § 40 (quorum of a majority) with RMA § 8.24 (quorum
can be as low as one third).
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ity's dilution with an increase in authorized shares, as few as
one-third of the directors can formulate the needed amend-
ment to articles of incorporation.5 0 Moreover, the RMA now
provides that a majority of the shares voting on an amendment,
that is, those present in person or by proxy, rather than a ma-
jority of the shares entitled to vote, can in many instances
amend the articles.5 1 Thus, at a shareholders' meeting, as few
as one-sixth of the total outstanding shares could approve the
amendment to increase authorized shares.
To eliminate minority representation, however, a share is-
suance may not even be necessary. The RMA authorizes com-
mon stock redeemable at the corporation's option.5 2 If
redeemable common stock exists in the corporation and the mi-
nority holds shares of it, the directors could cause redemption
of the redeemable common, on either a discriminatory or non-
discriminatory basis, 53 and thereby dilute or eliminate the mi-
nority interest.
Common shares are likely to be both the residual owner-
ship and voting interests in a corporation. The objection to re-
deemable common shares has been that the device gives
management the power "of reducing common stockholders,"
the residual interests, "to the status of impotent money-provid-
ers."54 For that reason, such shares have had little currency in
American corporation law. A corporation has had to have at
least one broad class of non-redeemable stock holding the
residual interest.5 5 The RMA drafters, though, analogize re-
deemable common stock to typical and ubiquitous share trans-
fer restrictions, more commonly known as buy-sell
agreements.5 6
Buy-sell agreements often give a corporation an option to
50. RMA § 8.24.
51. Compare MBCA § 59(3) (majority entitled to vote) with RMA § 10.03
(majority of those present unless amendment would give rise to dissenters'
rights). Prior amendments to the MBCA permitted shareholder quorums as
low as one-third and reduced vote requirements from two-thirds to a majority.
See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
52. RMA § 6.01(d).
53. But see supra notes 30-39 and accompanying text; Petty v. Penntech
Papers, Inc., 347 A.2d 140 (Del. Ch. 1975) (selective redemption enjoined on ba-
sis of fiduciary duty). See also infra notes 68-75 and accompanying text.
54. Comment, Unqualified Redemption of Common Stock- A Question of
Public Policy, 50 Nw. U. L. REV. 558, 566 (1955).
55. See, e.g., MBCA § 15 (allowing only special or preferred classes of stock
to be redeemable). Cf. RMA § 6.01(d)(1)(ii) (permitting redeemable common
shares, but only "if there exists at least one class of voting common shares not
subject to redemption").
56. RMA § 6.01 comment 3.
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acquire a shareholder's common shares. The right to exercise
that option, however, is contingent upon specified triggering
events, such as an attempted share sale to a third party, termi-
nation of an employee-shareholder's employment, or a share-
holder's death or disability.57 The RMA drafters conspicuously
fail to note that with redeemable common shares the only trig-
gering event will be management's unilateral decision to re-
deem. Of course, a desire to silence or eliminate minority
shareholdings can in whole or in part motivate that decision.
If the minority does have a voice in the corporation through
cumulative voting and redeemable common shares do not exist
or are not held by the minority, analysis again reverts to a
share issuance as the means to dilute and silence the minority.
Under the RMA the corporation can issue the shares to friendly
hands who can pay for the shares not only with cash or prop-
erty but even with promissory notes or the mere promise of fu-
ture services.5 8
Traditionally, American corporation statutes have refused
to accept future services or promissory notes as valid consider-
ation for shares.5 9 Knowledgeable lawyers, though, could effec-
tively evade the prohibition by using par value stock and
ensuring that par value was low, for example, fifty cents per
share.6 0 The share subscriber in effect paying with future serv-
ices would pay par value while other subscribers paid full or
market value, say, five dollars per share.61 If the lawyer had so
structured the transaction, the five dollar subscriber could base
a complaint only upon a loose construct known as the rule of
equitable contribution. That rule states that, beyond the legal
requirement to pay par value, similarly situated subscribers
only have to pay about the same consideration if purchasing at
about the same time.62 Courts, though, usually find the sub-
57. See, e.g., G. SEWARD & W. NAuss, supra note 22, § 9.11, at 380-82 (sample
buy-sell agreement).
58. RMA § 6.21.
59. See, e.g., MBCA § 19. Cf. NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.210 (1979) (labor, serv-
ices, personal property, or real estate may be consideration for shares, but only
if the consideration is paid in full prior to issuance of the shares).
60. An additional effect may be to keep the corporation's annual franchise
or license fee low, since the fee sometimes is based upon par value of the au-
thorized shares. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.40.060 (1974). Cf. MBCA
§ 130 (tax based on number of shares rather than aggregate par values).
61. See Herwitz, Allocation of Stock Between Services and Capital in the
Organization of a Close Corporation, 75 HARv. L REV. 1098, 1111-13 (1962).
62. See Bodell v. General Gas & Elec. Corp., 15 Del. Ch. 119, 131-139, 132 A.
442, 447-50 (1926).
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scribers not to have been similarly situated.63
The RMA drafters cite this ease of evasion as the reason
for eliminating the prohibition on stock for future services or
for promissory notes.64 They fail, however, to discuss the poli-
cies underlying the rule. Through the years commentators
have given various reasons for the prohibition, including, for
example, that a promise of future services would yield nothing
for creditors upon insolvency.65 A real reason for the prohibi-
tion may be simply that many frauds or sharp deals start out
that way. Promoters or insiders tendering future consideration
may pay little or nothing for shares, while innocent third par-
ties pay the full price.
Disclosure may palliate the problem to some degree.
6 6
With state law prohibitions on stock for future services, how-
ever, the medium may have been the message. Statutes clearly
signaled that something could often be askew with stock for
services or notes. The RMA drafters have given little thought
to beefing up the prohibition. Instead they have adopted the
easy choice, elimination of the prohibition.67
In the hypothetical corporation, directors could also issue
shares to themselves. The RMA would facilitate that transfer.
A new provision expressly empowers directors to approve
share options as incentive plans for directors, officers, and em-
ployees, without shareholder approval. 68 As a further precau-
tion against future trouble from a minority, including, for
example, a potential tender offeror, the corporation could have
options outstanding to directors and other sets of friendly
hands. Exercise of these options would dilute the interest of
the minority, or potential tender offeror with a toehold or larger
minority position.
As noted above, the RMA allows a corporation to accept
promissory notes or future services as consideration for shares.
Under the RMA it could also lend corporate funds to directors,
63. See, e.g., Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Hodgman, 13 F.2d 781 (3d Cir. 1926); Bodell
v. General Gas & Elec. Corp., 15 Del. Ch. 119, 132 A. 442 (1926).
64. RMA § 6.21 comment.
65. Herwitz, supra note 61, at 1105-06.
66. Where federal securities laws require registration, disclosure is affirm-
atively required. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5278 (July 16, 1972)
(hydrograph disclosure of cheap or free stock). See also SEC Rule 253(c), 17
C.F.R. § 230.253(c) (1982) (in addition to disclosure, escrow of stock for services
required).
67. A physically remote section of the RMA does require disclosure when
stock is issued for future services or promissory notes. See RMA § 16.21(b).
68. RMA § 6.24.
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officers, and employees for use in the purchase of shares. 69
Prior MBCA versions have required two-thirds shareholder ap-
proval for loans to directors and officers.7 0 Some MBCA juris-
dictions went so far as flatly to prohibit such loans.71 The RMA
now sweeps away all restrictions on corporate loans to officers
and directors.7 2 Directors could, for example, pledge the shares
themselves as collateral for the loans. Both accounting practice
and common sense dictate that such collateral is often of little
value since a corporation's own shares have no worth in the
corporation's own hands.73 Nevertheless, the RMA discusses
neither the risk nor the appearance of abuse that loans to di-
rectors or officers can involve.
Finally, if the RMA corporation under discussion were to
be a little old-fashioned, electing to have preemptive rights, a
share issuance to directors and officers could nonetheless be
the means of diluting the minority. Where preemptive rights
do exist, the MBCA alternative section and the RMA do a serv-
ice by codifying standard exceptions to the preemptive rights
doctrine.7 4 These exceptions existed at common law, but in va-
rying and ambiguous form.75 The RMA alternative provision,
however, invents and inserts a new exception, one unknown to
common law preemptive rights formulations. This exception
makes preemptive rights inapplicable to "shares issued as in-
centives to directors, officers, or employees."76
As the hypothetical under discussion has demonstrated,
shareholders have never had complete protection against a
69. See RMA §§ 3.02(12), 8.32.
70. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.440 (1974) (two-thirds); MBCA § 47
(majority).
71. See, e.g., ALAsK STAT. § 10.05.213 (1962).
72. EMA §§ 3.02(12) (general corporate powers include power to lend
money and credit to directors, officers, employees, and agents), 8.32 (board of
directors may promulgate "a general plan authorizing loans and guarantees"
for directors).
73. See, e.g., P. DEFUESE, K. JOHNSON & R. MACLEOD, MONTGOMERY'S Au-
DrIING 617-19 (9th ed. 1975) (valuation of treasury stock).
74. See MBCA § 26A, RMA § 6.30.
75. Compare Yasik v. Wachtel, 25 Del. Ch. 247, 17 A.2d 309 (1941) (no pre-
emptive right in shares issued pursuant to original plan of financing) with Ross
Transport, Inc. v. Crothers, 185 Md. 573, 45 A.2d 267 (1946) (no preemptive right
where shares are part of original issue unless conditions have changed). See
also N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 622(c) (5) (McKinney 1963) (no preemptive right in
originally authorized shares issued in first two years of corporate existence).
Cf. RMA § 6.30(e) (3) (no preemptive right in first six months after
incorporation).
76. RMA § 6.30(e) (i). Cf. MBCA § 26A(a) (i) (no preemptive right in
shares issued to directors, officers or employees if issuance previously author-
ized by a shareholder vote).
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squeeze or freeze-out by means of a share issuance. Fifteen
years ago, however, the shareholders did have several statutory
and common law shields, none of which afforded complete pro-
tection. In combination, though, the protection afforded would
in most cases prevent management from achieving nefarious
ends.7 7 Tomorrow under the RMA, or even today under the
MBCA, all or most of these shareholder protections are gone.
In addition, the RMA will give corporate management a prolif-
erating choice of swords to use, although, perhaps, no one of
them may be capable of striking a death blow to the minority.
In combination, though, the RMA provisions give, and have as
an avowed aim the bestowal of, an almost infinite range of
choices for corporate management to use for good or for evil as
they wish.
B. THE REVISED MODEL ACT-FURTHER EVALUATION
Many other RMA provisions also purposefully eliminate all
substantive or other control over corporate entities. 78 Some of
these provisions have surface appeal. Others run flatly counter
to well-developed state or federal policy.79
1. The "Need" for Flexibility
All of this elimination is done in the name of flexibility.
Repeatedly, the RMA official comments reason that this or that
relaxation or elimination of a formerly required procedure or
substantive command is required because "flexibility" is
77. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
78. See, e.g., RMA §§ 2.03 (secretary of state or analogous official no longer
required to ascertain upon filing if articles of incorporation conform to law),
6.03(b) (directors may be granted blank check authority to determine relative
rights and preferences of new issuances of preferred shares), 6.40(d) (directors
have power to revalue corporate assets for purposes of declaring a dividend or
making other distributions), 11.03(g) (in surviving corporation, no shareholder
vote required on merger if merger will not cause more than 20% increase in
shares outstanding).
79. See, e.g., RMA § 7.28 (elimination of cumulative voting); supra notes 45-
47 and accompanying text. Seven state constitutions mandate cumulative vot-
ing. Ten other states statutorily mandate cumulative voting in all corporations.
W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 47, at 260. See also RMA § 3.02(16) com-
ment (permitting corporate "contributions ... that may not be charitable, such
as for political purposes or to influence elections"). Federal law, of course,
makes criminal direct corporate contributions to political campaigns. See 2
U.S.C. § 441b (1982), construed in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). Indirect corpo-
rate support for elections, such as through political action committees, is also
currently a matter of some debate. See, e.g., Isaacson, Running with the PACs,
TimE, Oct. 25, 1982, at 20.
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needed and "discretion" is necessary.80 Curiously, in their
comments the RMA drafters use the passive voice.81 The ques-
tion that arises is flexibility and discretion for whom. The an-
swer is flexibility and discretion for corporate managements
and, secondarily, for their counsel. At a minimum, the RMA
could forthrightly use the active voice in telling legislators and
opinionmakers that it is management who purportedly needs
additional flexibility.
The RMA is a lawyers' product. Members of the ABA Com-
mittee on Corporate Laws are corporate lawyers. 82 When faced
with a choice between substantive commands or "flexible" or-
ganizational guidelines, they consider the former but adopt the
latter. They do so not because of any ulterior motive, but
rather because they understandably believe the corporate bar
to be comprised of persons of rectitude and ability. Naturally,
such individuals would not allow the flexibility the statute
grants to be used for mean or sharp dealing.83 Coincidently,
however, that flexibility also may make easier counsel's task of
advising management, structuring a transaction, or authoring
an opinion letter. Under older MBCA versions, attorneys some-
times found it difficult to defend the legality of a transaction
because a substantive prohibition or command directly or indi-
rectly impinged on the transaction. Yet the RMA drafters fail
to heed Justice Holmes's admonition to approach and evaluate
the proposed statute from the perspective of a "bad man." Un-
doubtedly, there exist some members of the corporate bar with
only a modicum, or less, of integrity. There are also corporate
managers whom even the "vaguer sanctions of conscience" do
not affect.
80. See, e.g., EMA § 6.03 comment ("desirable flexibility"). See also Letter
from Elliott Goldstein to Stanley A. Kaplan (Jan. 25, 1982) (ALI project should
provide "flexible guidelines"; concepts of corporate governance should "evolve
flexibly").
81. See, e.g., RMA §§ 6.03 comment ('"bis section therefore permits
prompt action and gives desired flexibility."), 3.02 comment ("It is clear that
narrow and limited powers clauses are undesirable.").
82. And their circle is closed. Although membership on the myriad ABA
Section on Corporation, Business and Banking Law committees is open, mem-
bership on the Committee on Corporate Laws is closed. Wheeler, Chairman's
Message, 38 Bus. LAw., at viii (Nov. 1982).
83. Moreover, as A.A. Sommer has pointed out, few complex transactions
can go forward without a corporate lawyer's participation. Sommer, The Emerg-
ing Responsibilities of the Securities Lawyer, Address to the Banking, Corpora-
tion and Business Law Section, New York State Bar (Jan. 24, 1974), reproduced
in part in R. JENNINGS & H. Ma.RSH, supra note 46, at 1181-82, 1209-10.
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2. The RMA's Reliance on Fiduciary Duty
In truth, though, the seemingly infinite flexibility the RMA
will grant is not infinite. Corporate directors have independent
fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.84 Time and again the RMA
official comments, and occasionally the proposed statute itself,
remind the reader that exercise of this flexibility remains sub-
ject to fiduciary duty. Loans to corporate directors and officers,
redemption of redeemable common shares, issuance of stock
for future services or promissory notes, the directors and of-
ficers exemption to preemptive rights, amendments to articles
of incorporation, and other enabling provisions, the reader is
reminded, are all subject to the command that directors act
with due care, in good faith, and in the corporation's best
interests. 85
Considered together with the ever-escalating degree of flex-
ibility the statute grants, all of this RMA effort to remind of
fiduciary duty has several effects. First, it appears that the en-
tire edifice of corporate law has begun to totter on the head of a
pin. Every issue comes directly or indirectly to fiduciary duty.
Moreover, that fiduciary duty is not the strict common law vari-
ety which even at its best produced inconsistent results. In-
stead, it has become a much weakened statutory variety
designed, in the main, as a safe harbor into which corporate
managements may sail.8 6
Second, commentary reminding lawyers and judges that
fiduciary duty overrides the enabling statutory provision is just
that-commentary. In the process of enactment and subse-
quent use, the commentary accompanying the statute often be-
comes lost or mired down in a morass of other commentary and
precedent. Even if the official commentary remains central, the
statute and its enabling language will most often carry the day.
The commentary's reference to fiduciary duty will play a role
only in case of ambiguity or a void in the statute itself.
A third consequence of dependence on fiduciary duty is
that it leaves aggrieved shareholders with no clear or easy
means of resolving their grievances. The presence of "bright-
84. See supra notes 28-29 (fiduciary duty under state law).
85. RMA §§3.02(12) comment, 6.01(d) comment, 6.21(c) comment, 6.30
comment, 10.01 comment. See also id. § 6.40 (fiduciary duty as a control on di-
rectors' reevaluation of assets and declaration of dividends).
86. See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text. The inconsistency that
even strong forms of fiduciary duty can produce will be discussed infra text ac-
companying notes 284-91.
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line rules"87 containing substantive prohibitions could prevent
a dispute from arising in the first place or may enable parties to
resolve a question through negotiation. In litigation, a substan-
tive rule may enable the parties to resolve issues before trial,
such as on motion for summary judgment. Under the RMA
scheme of reliance on fiduciary duty, "the bright line" fades
and questions of fact abound. Good faith is an issue likely to
be ubiquitous. The accompanying issue of fairness, another
question of fact, will also remain.8 8 Resolution in advance of
trial, such as on motion for summary judgment, will become
only a remote possibility.89 The plaintiff-shareholder will have
the burden of proving the transaction unfair, a heavy burden
indeed when the parties' relative resources are compared.90 Al-
though noble in purpose and sentiment, the higher call to
fiduciary duty may foreclose vindication of all claims except
those where the stake is very large or the shareholder very
bitter.
Finally, in recent years corporate counsel have dusted off
and resurrected a few older precedents which permitted a
board of directors to dismiss a derivative action as not in the
best interests of the corporation. Courts have generally ac-
cepted this premise.91 Noteworthy is that a defendant officer or
87. The oft-used phrase is attributable to Justice Douglas. Kern County
Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 610 (1973) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
88. Under the RMA, if directors have had disclosure and a vote on a trans-
action, the shareholder challenging the transaction has the burden of proving it
not fair at the time it was "authorized, approved, or ratified." RMA § 8.31.
89. A court will grant summary judgment only if no issue as to a material
fact exists and the moving party is entitled to succeed on that issue as a matter
of law. Thus, summary judgment is inappropriate where the issue of good faith
plays a dominant role. See Pfizer, Inc. v. International Rectifier Corp., 538 F.2d
180, 185 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1040 (1977).
90. Shareholders must stake discovery costs out of their own funds, includ-
ing costs for counsel's attendance at the numerous depositions the defending
corporate law firm is likely to schedule and the retention of experts such as ap-
praisers and financial analysts. See MODEL CODE OF PROFEssIONAL RESPONSI-
Biry DR 5-103(B) (1980) (a lawyer cannot advance or guarantee financial
assistance or litigation expenses for a client).
91. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979), first revived the possibility of di-
rector power to dismiss as a matter of state law. The Supreme Court view ap-
parently was based upon a few older state law decisions: McKee v. Rogers, 18
DeL Ch. 81, 156 A. 191 (1931); Rice v. Wheeling Dollar Say. & Trust Co., 130
N.E.2d 442 (Ohio Ct. App. 1954); Goodwin v. Castleton, 19 Wash. 2d 748, 144 P.2d
725 (1944) (unanimous shareholder, rather than director, vote to dismiss). See,
e.g., Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. at 487 (Stewart, J., concurring). Auerbach v. Ben-
nett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979), and Lewis v. Ander-
son, 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980), are two
decisions in the first wave of cases implementing the doctrine. Recently, how-
19831
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
director could have violated the duty of care or loyalty the de-
rivative action seeks to vindicate and the directors could have
previously refused to take action on the demand of the share-
holder bringing the action.92 Nonetheless, in a second bite at
the apple, the board can decide that the suit is not in the corpo-
ration's best interests. 93 The court would then apply the busi-
ness judgment rule, not delve into the merits of the action, and
dismiss the suit based upon the directors' recommendation.94
These developments make a charade of the RMA's feigned sen-
sitivity to and near total reliance upon fiduciary duty.
3. Conclusion of RMA Analysis
These criticisms of the RMA are not to say that corporation
laws should instead become sumptuary laws, regulating corpo-
rate officers' and directors' every action.9 5 On the other hand,
corporation laws should have more content and philosophy
than mere flexibility alone. Yet American state corporation
laws have gone so far in that direction, increasingly under the
banner of the MBCA and now of the proposed RMA, that state
corporation law now has little apparent content. Flexibility has
become pandemic.
H. VARIATIONS FROM THE TRADITIONAL MODEL--AN
OPPOSITE TACK IN BRITISH COMPANY LAW
In the last extensive comparison of British and American
corporation law, published in 1956, Professor L.C.B. Gower sug-
gested that the two systems had sufficient similarities to make
a comparison possible yet sufficient differences to make it fruit-
ever, the Delaware Supreme Court has adopted a stricter, two prong test for
such dismissals. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
92. FED. R. Civ. PRo. 23.1, and similar rules in most state civil practice acts,
require that a shareholder have made a demand on the board of directors
before being allowed to proceed with a derivative action.
93. See generally Coffee & Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit:
An Evaluation and a Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81 CoLum. L REv. 261
(1981); Dent, The Power of Directors to Terminate Shareholder Litigation" The
Death of the Derivative Suit, 75 Nw. U. L. REV. 96 (1980).
94. But see Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788-89 (Del. 1981)
(court first determines that directors dismissing the suit acted in good faith and
then exercises its independent business judgment as to whether the suit is in
the corporation's best interest).
95. See, e.g., Folk, State Statutes: Their Role in Prescribing Norms of Re-
sponsible Management Conduct 31 Bus. LAw. 1031 (1976). Cf. RMA § 3.01 com-
ment (where the RMA drafters speak of the "limitless lawful purpose
corporation"-an apt summary of the entire RMA's intent and practical effect).
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ful.96 Professor Gower concluded that
[t]he constitution of the English business corporation is still regarded
as essentially contractual. Whereas the American statutes tend to lay
down mandatory rules, the British Companies Act relies far more on
the technique of the Partnership Act, providing a standard form which
applies only in the absence of contrary agreement .... 97
Thus, British company law and the model it creates has al-
ways been thought to be, in American parlance, "consensual"
or "enabling." As exemplified by the Revised Model Act, how-
ever, American corporation law has greatly become enabling. A
question that arises then is whether, in their permissive as-
pects, American statutes have surpassed even British company
law. A short answer is the affirmative, especially since the last
several years have seen a little-noticed trend moving company
law back toward a restrictive model. Recent companies acts
contain numerous substantive commands and set limits be-
yond which solicitors and their clients cannot go in providing
otherwise.9 8 To a great degree, company law has become an
example of what American corporation law once was.
A. THE TRADmONAL BRITISH COMPANY LAW MODEL
The British counterparts of American articles of incorpora-
tion and bylaws are the memorandum and articles of associa-
tion.9 9 The memorandum of association will be brief, but not as
brief as typical American articles of incorporation. The memo-
randum sets forth the company's name, whether the registered
office is in England, Scotland, or Wales, and the company's pur-
poses or "objects."100 In most American jurisdictions, where
the corporate purpose "may be stated to be ... any or all law-
ful business,"o1 the typical corporate purpose clause will be
brief. The British ultra vires doctrine, however, still voids ultra
vires acts, 0 2 causing firms to list long detailed statements of
96. Gower, supra note 10, at 1370. There have been more recent compari-
sons in the related securities law area. See, e.g., Branson, Some Suggestions
From a Comparison of British and American Tender Offer Regulation, 56 CoR-
NELL L. REV. 685 (1971).
97. Gower, supra note 10, at 1376. A short comparative work is Peppiatt,
British and American Business Law: A Brief Comparison, 16 Bus. LAw. 54
(1960).
98. See infra notes 121-202 and a-companying text.
99. Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, ch. 38, §§ 1-10 [hereinafter cited as
CA 1948].
100. CA. 1948, § 2. See also L LEIGH, V. JoFFE & D. GOLDBERG, NoRTHEY &
LEIGH'S INTRODUCTION TO COMPANY LAw 65-66 (2d ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as
NORTHEY & LEIGH].
101. MBCA § 54(c).
102. In re Jon Beauforte (London) Ltd. [1953] Ch. 131, [1953] 1 All E.R. 634.
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the company's objects in the memorandum. Unlike the com-
mon American practice, British memoranda of association can
never merely state that the object of the company is any lawful
purpose.103
The memorandum must indicate whether the company is
unlimited, limited by guarantee,104 or, most commonly, limited
by shares. The amount of share capital and how it is to be di-
vided into shares of one or more classes must follow. 05 Fi-
nally, the memorandum sets forth the association clause, in
which the share subscribers state their desire to form the com-
pany and to take the number of shares set opposite their
names. 0 6 In contrast, American statutes do not require any
listing of subscribers at ali.107
The articles of association in a British company bear little
resemblance to bylaws in an American corporation. Ostensi-
bly, both documents govern the corporation's or company's in-
ternal affairs, that is, date and place of shareholders' or
members' meetings, quorums, officers' or managing directors'
responsibilities, and the like.108 Yet American practice typi-
cally has left many of these items to statute. In addition, in
many instances the model a traditional American statute sets
up cannot be varied. Or if variance from the statutory model is
permitted, the statute sets limits beyond which the parties can-
not go in providing otherwise.109
Traditional British articles of association are longer than
typical American bylaws, and deal with more important mat-
ters. Restrictions on share sales, rights attached to various
Cf. MBCA § 7 (ultra vires acts merely voidable rather than void and only when
"equitable").
103. See, e.g., NORTHEY & LEIGH, supra note 100, at 81 ("long and prolix ob-
jects clauses"). Professor Gower has urged that in the American fashion com-
pany law should permit broadly stated clauses. LC.B. GowER, supra note 5, at
179. Cf. MBCA § 3 (corporations can form for any lawful purpose).
104. "[A] company having the liability of its members limited by the memo-
randum to such amount as the members may respectively thereby undertake
to contribute to the assets of the company in the event of its being wound up
." C.A.1948 § 1(2)(b).
105. CA. 1948 § 2(4) (a).
106. Id. §§ 1-2.
107. See, e.g., MBCA § 54 (contents of articles of incorporation).
108. See C.A. 1948, sched. 1, Table A; MBCA § 27.
109. See, e.g., MBCA § 32 (unless otherwise provided shareholder quorum is
a majority "but in no event shall a quorum consist of less than one third"). See
also In re Win. Faehndrich, Inc., 2 N.Y.2d 468, 141 N.E.2d 597, 161 N.Y.S.2d 99
(1957) (higher quorum requirement struck down because in bylaws rather than
articles). Cf. CA. 1948 § 134(c) (in a private company tw6 members and in the
case of any other company as few as three members can constitute a quorum).
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share classes, the number of directors, and directors' rotation,
will all be dealt with in articles of association.110 There is a
statutory model: the famous "Table A" in the First Schedule of
Companies Act 1948. Table A, though, is only a model."' Solic-
itors can and do vary Table A articles. Moreover, company law
gives few limits beyond which the drafter cannot go in provid-
ing otherwise. Last of all, unlike the American states where by-
laws remain an internal document, in Britain the statute
requires that the articles of association as well as the memo-
randum be fied with the Company Registry." 2 The articles
thus become public documents.
B. VARIATIONS FROM THE MODEL--A DISCLAIMER
In certain respects, the base for comparison between
American corporation and British company law is imperfect.
Cumulative voting, for example, has never existed in company
law.113 Commentators have praised its effect in the United
States, but have suggested other means of accomplishing simi-
lar effects in Great Britain."14 The derivative action is rela-
tively obscure in Britain.15 The society is less litigious than
the United States." 6 Contingent fee arrangements are unethi-
cal. And the losing party must always pay the prevailing
party's costs." 7 Finally, the rule of Foss v. Harbottle118 does
not permit a member to make a claim based upon a corporate
110. See generally LC.B. GOWER, supra note 5, at 308-09; NORTHEY & LEIGH,
supra note 100, at 90-92.
111. See CA 1948 sched. 1, Table A.
112. CA 1948 § 12. A company limited by shares need not file articles but, if
filing is omitted, Table A will apply. Id. § 8(2). Since most all companies will
want to vary Table A in one or more respects, articles are routinely filed. See
LCB. GOWER, supra note 5, at 309.
113. NoRTHEY & LEIGH, supra note 100, at 110.
114. See, e.g., Gower, supra note 6, at 397-98.
115. The term, derivative action, has just begun to gain currency in Great
Britain. See, e.g., Davies, Companies in General 1980 J. Bus. LAw 415, 415 ("The
judge adopted the useful American expression 'derivative action'. . . .") (dis-
cussing Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd. (No. 2)
[1980] 3 W.L.R. 543, [1980] 2 All. E.R. 841).
116. See, e.g., Benston, Accounting Standards in the United States and the
United Kingdom: Their Nature, Causes and Consequences, 28 VA'ND. L, REv.
235, 251, 258 (1975) (peer pressure rather than litigation plays a major role);
Branson, supra note 96, at 715 n.150 & 723 n.184 (possibility of adverse publicity
or censure rather than litigation plays major policing role).
117. See Grossfeld & Ebke, Controlling the Modern Corporation: A Compar-
ative View of Corporate Power in the United States and Europe, 26 AM. J.
Comp. L. 397, 419 (1978).
118. [1843] 2 Hare 461. For a more recent case applying the rule, see Ed-
wards v. Halliwell [1950] 2 All. ER. 1064 (CA).
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right if the shareholders could have, but not necessarily have,
ratified the act of which the member complains." 9 All of these
factors make derivative actions different and less frequent in
Great Britain. Instead, to a great degree company law relies
upon other sanctions or remedies, such as criminal penalties
and inspections of companies' affairs by the Department of
Trade.120
Keeping in mind, then, that the edifices on top of which a
comparison is to be mounted are not completely equivalent, a
comparison can nonetheless go forward.
C. INTEGRITY OF CAPrrAL
Company law allowed no preemptive right until 1980. At a
time when the American MBCA, and now the RMA, winnow
away the preemptive right,121 company law now requires for
the first time that companies give members the opportunity to
preserve their proportionate ownership and voting rights.122
The preemptive right is only presumptive in private compa-
nies.123 Such companies can eliminate preemptive rights by
provision in the memorandum or articles.124 Even public com-
panies, by special resolution approved by the members, can re-
solve that the preemption right will "not apply to a specified
allotment of equity securities.' 25 Public companies cannot,
however, eliminate the preemption right on a permanent
basis.126
As with the preemptive right, much of recent company law
119. The rule, however, does admit of many exceptions. See LC.B. GowER,
supra note 5, at 644-48"; NORTHEY & LEIGH, supra note 100, at 197-98. Moreover,
the courts have demonstrated a readiness to create new exceptions whenever
"natural justice" so requires. See Davies, supra note 115, at 417.
120. See, e.g., infra notes 130, 142, and accompanying text (criminal penal-
ties); infra note 183 (appointment of inspectors).
121. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
122. Companies Act, 1980, ch. 22, § 17(1) [hereinafter cited as C.A. 1980].
123. Private companies are those which do not offer shares to the public.
C.A. 1980 § 1. It is an offense punishable by fine for a private company to at-
tempt to sell shares to the public. Id. § 15(1). All other restrictions on private
companies, such as the limit of members to 50, have been removed. Id. sched. 4
(repealing C.A. 1948 § 28).
124. Id. § 17(9).
125. Id. § 18(2).
126. Thus, it has been said that the new "pre-emption right" will not have
"much or any effect on British corporate practice." NORTHEY & LEIGH, supra
note 100, at 234. The stock exchange has long required preemptive rights and
companies have found the right useful. "More new capital is raised by this
method than by any other form of issue ... ." L.C.B. GowER, supra note 5, at
343.
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amendment has related to raising capital. To become a public
company, that is, one entitled to sell shares to the public, a
company must now register as such. 2 7 A company must have
paid in £50,000 ($82,500) in share capital before it can regis-
ter.128 For the future, Parliament has empowered the Secretary
of State for Trade to adjust the amount, presumably upward,
should inflation occur or abuse persist with the £50,000 require-
ment.129 Severe penalties exist for breach of the minimum cap-
ital limitation upon going public.130
Such a limitation on access to other people's money would
cut against the grain of American egalitarianism. Some years
ago the MBCA eliminated even the state corporation law re-
quirement that a corporation have $1000 paid in before the cor-
poration commenced business.131 Moreover, the full and fair
disclosure philosophy of American federal securities law has
long held that if an entity fully discloses, even complete penury
will not prevent the offer of securities to the public.13 2
An advantage of the new British minimum capital require-
ment is that the scheme has forced thought not only about the
process of raising money but also about the necessity of main-
taining capital after incorporation or after registration as a pub-
lic company. For example, British public companies which
issue shares for property must have an independent, qualified
person appraise the property. The appraiser must report the
valuation methods used, the date of the valuation, and that the
valuation is reasonable.133 By contrast, under American stat-
utes directors rather than independent third parties value
property to be received for shares. In the absence of fraud,
American statutes deem directors' valuation "conclusive." 34
127. Under CA. 1980 §§ 5-10, public companies have had to register as "new"
public companies or, if they did not meet the new minimum capital and other
requirements, as private companies. Before offering shares to the public, pri-
vate companies must register as public, demonstrating compliance with the re-
quirements. Id. § 5(1).
128. CA. 1980 § 15(1). For purposes of this article conversions have been
made at a rate of $1.65 U.S. per £.
129. CA. 1980 §§ 3(2), 85.
130. See, e.g., C.A. 1980 § 15 (criminal penalties); id. sched. 3, 27 (company
subject to being wound up by order of court).
131. Scott, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act 24 Bus. LAw.
291, 300 (1968) (summary of the then-forthcoming MBCA Second).
132. See, e.g., SECURrTEs EXCHANGE ComMnssioN, THE WORK OF THE SEC, 2
(1980) ("factors affecting the merits of securities have no bearing on the ques-
tion whether securities may be registered").
133. CA. 1980 § 24.
134. See, e.g., MBCA § 19; NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.210 (1979) (in the absence of
"actual fraud" directors' judgment shall be "conclusive").
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In Britain the substantive rules become more complex
when the company issues shares in exchange for property of a
director, including managing directors.135 Rather than relying
on general concepts such as fiduciary duty, as the American
RMA has done,136 new company law provisions require a mem-
bers' vote when a director or member of a director's family of-
fers non-cash consideration for shares, or cash, of the
company.137 These provisions apply whenever the ostensible
value of the consideration exceeds £50,000 ($82,500) or ten per-
cent of the company's net assets, and may apply in addition to
an independent appraisal.138
To insure integrity of capital, several other types of trans-
actions, or share allotments, now come under substantive con-
trol. In British public companies, services are no longer eligible
consideration for shares.139 No British company, public or pri-
vate, can issue shares at a discount-all share allottees must
pay the same nominal value, as well as any premium that other
allottees pay. 40 Violation of these provisions subjects the allot-
tee to liability in cash for the shortfall or disregard of the
tainted shares.14' In addition, for unlawful share allotments the
company and any responsible officer are guilty of an offense,
punishable by fine.142
In Britain, boards of directors have authority to issue au-
thorized shares for five years only. Before expiration of that
period, directors must return to the members for renewal of
their authority.143 Such a provision guards against directors us-
ing shares authorized years before to silence the minority, a sit-
uation possible in the United States. In the early halcyon days
of corporate existence, shareholders may have approved arti-
cles of incorporation authorizing many shares in order to be-
stow upon directors flexibility to pursue opportunities as they
arose. Years later, directors could use those authorized shares
to dilute or squeeze out a troublesome minority or a tender of-
135. Under British company law, the term "director" includes managing di-
rectors, the equivalent of senior officers in an American corporation. See LC.B.
GOWER, supra note 5, at 154-55.
136. See supra notes 84-94 and accompanying text.
137. CA. 1980 § 48. See also NORTHEY & LEiGH, supra note 100, at 185.
138. CA. 1980 § 48.
139. Id. § 20(2).
140. Id. § 21. Cf. supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text (American prac-
tice where payment of par value, which can be set extremely low, is the only
real requirement).
141. C.A. 1980 §§ 20(3)-(4), 21 (2)-(3).
142. Id. § 30.
143. Id. § 14(3)-(4).
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feror who poses a threat to directors' incumbancy.144
A recent British provision aimed at maintenance of capital
once raised requires directors to call an extraordinary general
meeting whenever the company's net assets fall below one-half
of its paid-up share capital.14 5 Failure to call the members'
meeting within 28 days after knowledge of the condition or to
hold such a meeting within 56 days is an offense, punishable by
fine.14 6 Thus, in Britain, when its stewardship fails, manage-
ment must call the members' attention to that fact. Sharehold-
ers, or members, need not wait until the horse is gone, as in the
United States, where the annual report or annual financial
statements may or may not alert shareholders to a deteriorat-
ing condition.
A last example of company law's opposite tack is the 1981
provision disallowing capital structures in which the company
can redeem all shares. 47 At precisely the same time, in the in-
terest of flexibility the American RMA drafters propose new
statutory authority for redeemable common shares. 48
Not all the recent British revisions are improvements or
good in an absolute sense. This comparative, and merely par-
tial, exposition of finance and integrity of capital does show,
however, that as flexibility reaches a zenith in American corpo-
ration law, British company law is retreating from a scheme
once thought to be the apotheosis of flexibility.
D. DISCLOSURE
In the United States, corporation law requires a corpora-
tion to furnish shareholders with annual financial statements,
but only if the corporation prepares financial statements. 49 No
affirmative requirement, however, states that corporations must
144. See, e.g., Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 366, 380-84 (2d Cir.
1980) (tender offer); Bellows v. Porter, 201 F.2d 429, 433-34 (8th Cir. 1953) (mi-
nority squeeze out); Tallant v. Executive Equities, Inc., 232 Ga. 807, 809, 209
S.E.2d 159, 160 (1974) (same).
145. CA. 1980 § 34.
146. Id.
147. Companies Act, 1981, ch. 62, § 45(2) [hereinafter CA. 1981]. See also id.
§ 46(3) (company may not repurchase so as to eliminate all but redeemable
shares).
148. Under the RMA, however, at least one class of common shares must re-
main unredeemable. See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
149. MBCA § 52. The dearth of state law disclosure requirements is re-
viewed in Knauss, Corporate Governance-A Moving Targe4 79 MicH. L REv.
478, 486-87 (1981) and, generally, in Knauss, A Reappraisal of the Role of Disclo-
sure, 62 MICH. L. REV. 607 (1964).
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prepare financial statements.'5 0 In Britain, the Companies Acts
of 1967, 1976, 1980, and 1981 have refined and increased the cor-
porate disclosure companies must furnish not only to members
but also to the public. In addition company law has installed a
number of safeguards to insure the quality of such
disclosure.151
All British companies must appoint an auditor who is a
member of one of the Institutes of Chartered Accountants or
the Association of Certified Accountants.152 The auditor must
render an opinion based upon the British statutory "true and
fair view" standard.153 By contrast, American corporation law
does not require an audit or independent review of any kind. If
they are prepared at all, financial statements can be compiled
by the most unschooled of bookkeepers. 54
In addition, the MBCA requires only that financial state-
ments, if they are prepared at all, be prepared "in accordance
with generally accepted accounting principles.' 55 Conform-
ance to generally accepted accounting principles gives rise only
to a probability that the accounts present a true and fair view.
The British true and fair requirement goes further.156
In Britain, all companies must both prepare and file annual
accounts.15 7 Hence, a member or any interested person can
obtain financial information through the Registry of Compa-
nies.15 8 The accounts so fied must present "a true and fair
view of the state of affairs of the company" and of "the profit or
150. The RMA does propose to delete the MBCA limitation, making provi-
sion of financial statements mandatory for all corporations. RMA § 16.20.
151. See infra notes 152-64 and accompanying text.
152. Companies Act, 1976, ch. 69, §§ 13(1), 14(1) [hereinafter cited as C..
1976].
153. See C.A. 1948 § 149(1) ("true and fair view" standard); id. § 149(6),
amended by C.A. 1976, sched. 2 (criminal offense for failure to comply with ac-
counting standards).
154. See, e.g., MBCA § 52; Knauss, supra note 149, at 487.
155. MBCA § 52.
156. For a view that in actual practice the British standard does not go far
beyond, see Benston, supra note 116, at 267-68. For shades of meaning inherent
in fairness and generally accepted accounting principles standards, see United
States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006 (1970).
157. See C.A. 1948 §§ 124-26, 128; Companies Act, 1967, ch. 81, § 2 [hereinafter
C.A. 1967]. See also L.C.B. GOWER, upra note 5, at 501-02. The 1967 Act elimi-
nated the exempt private company, a company of fewer than 50 members
which did not have to file accounts. The view taken was "that the privilege of
limited liability ought to bear with it an obligation to make financial disclosure
in the interests of creditors and the public generally." NORTHEY & LEiGH, supra
note 100, at 11.
158. See C.A. 1948 § 426.
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loss for the financial year."159
Directors of British companies must include a directors' re-
port with the annual accounting.160 The report must comment
on the financial statements, including results in the accounting
period. The report also must comment on the company's state
of affairs, the amount recommended as a dividend, the amount
of any reserves the directors have had to establish, and other
matters the statute lists.161 Using the accounts they have pre-
pared, the auditors must then corroborate the required direc-
tors' report and report any inconsistency between the two.162
Under American state corporation laws' minimal requirements,
no commentary of any kind need accompany financial state-
ments which, as has been seen, do not even have to be pre-
pared in most instances.
Completing the disclosure package, all British companies
must make all directors' service contracts available for inspec-
tion.163 Although mere appointment as a director does not con-
stitute a service contract, any further arrangement with a
director must be reduced to writing and made available to the
company's members.164
On an internal basis, every British company must keep ac-
counting records sufficient (i) to show and explain the com-
pany's transactions, (ii) to disclose the company's financial
position at the time, and (iii) to enable the directors to ensure
that any balance sheet or profit and loss account prepared by
them gives a true and fair review of the company's state of af-
fairs. 165 Under American state law, corporations need only
keep "correct and complete books and records of account."166
159. The standard is found repeatedly in the various companies acts. See,
e.g., CA. 1967 § 14(c); CA. 1976 § 1(9); CA. 1980 sched. 3, 1 41 (3); CA. 1981
§ 1(1). Nonetheless, British case law has held that an auditor is not bound to
be a "bloodhound." In re Kingston Cotton Mill Co. (No. 2) [1896] 2 Ch. 279.
160. See CA. 1967 §§ 16-24; CA. 1976 §§ 1-2.
161. CA. 1967 § 16(1); CA. 1976, §§ 1-2.
162. CA. 1981 § 15.
163. CA. 1967 § 26. In addition, companies must limit service contracts in
time and in scope. See infra note 172 and accompanying text.
164. See CA. 1980 § 47. The contract need not be in writing. The terms of
an unwritten contract must be set out in a written memorandum, which is then
fied like a written contract. See CA. 1967 § 26.
165. CA. 1976 § 12(1)-(3).
166. MBCA § 52. Cf. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Pub. L No. 95-213, 91
Stat. 1494 (1977) (codified in part as Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(b) (2),
15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (2) (1976)). For American corporations governed by the fed-
eral securities law's affirmative disclosure requirements, see infra text accom-
panying note 168, the § 13(b) (2) requirement is to "make and keep books,
records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect
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American corporation law prompts only the most scant dis-
closure. Typically the only affirmative requirement is an an-
nual report to the secretary of state in the state of
incorporation, a report listing the directors and officers but con-
taining no financial information whatsoever. 167 Frequently,
American corporations make even this minimal return in an in-
complete manner, perhaps listing only a single corporate offi-
cial's name and address. Such an incomplete return is not of
great significance. The American report's principal purpose is
to prompt payment of the annual license or franchise fee, not to
force corporate disclosure. Only when American corporations
come under the aegis of federal securities laws do those compa-
nies come under meaningful, affirmative disclosure require-
ments. Federal securities laws apply only when a corporation
has $3 million or more in assets and a class of equity security
held by 500 or more persons.168 For smaller or more closely
held corporations, American corporation law presents a vac-
uum, or even a black hole, on the subject of disclosure.16 9 Over
the last fifteen or so years, British company law has proceeded
in precisely the opposite direction. 7 0
E. CONTROLS ON MANAGEMENT COMPENSATION AND
PERQUrsrrEs
As has been seen, American corporation law relies heavily
on a weakened concept of fiduciary duty as the sole control of
management compensation.171 By contrast, senior managers in
British companies are subject to a number of new substantive
the . . . dispositions of the assets of the issuer." Moreover, such companies
must "devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls to provide
reasonable assurances" that, inter alia, "access to assets" and "transactions"
are in accordance with "management's general or specific authorization." Id.
167. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.480 (1977).
168. This is referred to as 12(g) status. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§ 12(g), 15 U.S.C. § 771(g) (1976). See also SEC Securities Act Release No.
18,647 (April 15, 1982) (increase from $1 million to $3 million asset
requirement).
169. See Knauss, Corporate Governance-A Moving Target, supra note 149,
at 484. Dean Knauss estimates there are 100,000 American corporations with
from 11 to 499 shareholders and, hence, subject to no meaningful disclosure re-
quirements. Id. at 481.
170. Companies Act 1981 does reduce the scope of fied accounts and direc-
tor's report for medium sized companies, those with turnover (sales) of less
than £5.75 million ($7.63 million), balance sheet total less than £2.80 million
($4.62 million), and employee number less than 250. CA. 1981 § 8(3). The Act
further reduces requirements for small companies: £1.4 million ($2.3 million)
turnover, £700,000 ($1.2 million) balance sheet total, and 50 or fewer employees.
Id. § 8(2).
171. See supra notes 85-94 and accompanying text.
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restrictions on both compensation and perquisites.172 Com-
pany law also sets standards for disclosing directors' interests
in the company, for loaning funds to directors, and for purchas-
ing assets from or selling them to directors. 7 3
A British company must maintain a register disclosing di-
rectors' interests in the company's shares and debentures and
any changes in those ownership interests.174 Under American
law, only if corporations reach 12(g) status do they need to
make such disclosure. Moreover, American federal law re-
quires the director or officer, rather than the firm, to file the dis-
closure statement with the Securities and Exchange
Commission.175 Share ownership data for senior managers,
therefore, will not necessarily be available to shareholders
through the American corporation's principal offices, as it will
be in Britain.
At the same time the RMA is proposing removal of all re-
strictions on loans, loan guarantees, and similar benefits for se-
nior managers, 7 6 the British Companies Act of 1980 sets up a
thicket of restrictions on company loans and perquisites for di-
rectors or "connected persons." 77 For example, although a
British company can advance funds for the purpose of enabling
directors to perform their duties, such advances are limited to a
rolling maximum of £10,000 ($16,500) for any one director.
Moreover, at a general meeting, the members must approve the
plan for advances. 78 Beyond approved advances, the new pro-
visions severely limit loans, loan guarantees, or "quasi-loans" 79
172. For example, without the members' approval in a general meeting, di-
rectors' service contracts cannot exceed five years. CA. 1980 § 47. The term
"employment" is "wide enough" to bring contracts for employment as manag-
ing director or otherwise, contracts for services, and "consultancy contracts"
within the section. See id.; see also J. TImoN, THE COMPANmES ACT 1980, § 47
comment (1980).
173. See infra notes 174-84 and accompanying text.
174. CA. 1967 §§ 27, 29. With CA. 1980 §§ 68-73, company law has also set up
a prohibition against insider trading. The framework is criminal rather than
civil and criminal, as in the United States. For a description of the British
scheme, see Branson, Insider Trading: The British Regulation in Light of the
American Experience, 1982 J. Bus. LAw, 342-48, 413-20, 536-42.
175. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78q (1976).
176. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
177. CA. 1980 §§ 49-51. A "connected person" is a member of a director's
immediate household or a related trust or company. Id. § 64.
178. Id. §§ 50(5), 51.
179. The last category includes a substantial number of what Americans
term " perks," for example the provision of credit cards to directors. See, e.g.,
NORTHEY & LEiGH, supra note 100, at 120. Separate company law provisions iso-
late and make unlawful provision of assistance to directors for acquisition of
shares while in other respects relaxing the CA. 1948 § 54 absolute prohibition
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to directors.180 To deter violations, the Act makes directors
who approve prohibited transactions liable to the company181
and, in certain instances, subject to criminal penalties.182
Newer enactments give Department of Trade inspectors broad-
ened discovery powers with regard to the fruits of illegal loans,
quasi-loans, emoluments of office, or "any money which has
been in any way connected with any act or omission, or series
of acts or omissions, which on the part of [a] director consti-
tuted misconduct (whether fraudulent or not).183
The British limitations on a company's purchase, by share
issuance or for cash, of assets from directors have been dis-
cussed. Those same limitations also apply to a company's sale
of assets to directors.184
All of these company law limitations on senior managers
extend beyond persons who have formal titles. Limitations on
compensation and perquisites also apply to so-called "shadow
directors"-persons "in accordance with whose directions or in-
on companies assisting anyone in purchasing the company's shares. See, e.g.,
C.A. 1981 § 42(6) (permitting assistance for "employees share scheme[s]" but
excluding directors). Under § 43, private companies can assist director share
purchases if assistance is out of distributable profits, is approved by members
in a general meeting, and four to eight weeks have passed with no objection
having been voiced. Moreover, § 44 authorizes 10% of the company's share cap-
ital to apply to a court for cancellation of the shares purchased by a director
with financial assistance from the company.
180. Indeed, with respect to public companies, the named transactions are
flatly prohibited. C.A. 1980 §§ 49, 65(1).
181. CA. 1980 § 52.
182. Id. § 53.
183. C.A. 1981 § 86. Inspectors can be appointed on petition of a member or
on the Department of Trade's own initiative. Inspectors have broad powers to
make, publish, and then publicize their findings. See Maxwell v. Department of
Trade, [1974] Q.B. 523 (C.A.); In re Pergamon Press, Ltd. [1971] Ch. 388 (CA).
See generally Fraser, Administrative Power of Investigation Into Companies,
34 MOD. L. REv. 260 (1971). The inspector's report can also aid a potential plain-
tiff in reducing discovery costs and form the basis for civil litigation. L.C.B.
GowE, supra note 5, at 679-80. In 1977 the Department of Trade acted on 406 of
495 applications received, appointing 115 inspectors. DEP'r. OF TRADE, COMPA-
NIES iN 1977 (1978).
184. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. These new British enact-
ments must be read against a background which, while generally enabling, has
always placed severe restrictions on senior management's prerogatives. Com-
pare CA 1948 §§ 191-94, (strictly prohibiting any payment to directors for loss
of office, whether by takeover bid or otherwise) with Wall St. J., Sept. 8, 1982,
at 31, col. 3 (noting current American practice of voting "golden parachutes" for
directors and senior managers, especially in the event of a tender offer, e.g., $4
million golden parachute for single executive). See also CA 1948 § 448 (court
approval required for indemnity of directors except in cases of successful de-
fense). Cf. MBCA § 5 (plethora of routes to indemnity, including director vote
and opinion of counsel).
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structions the directors of a company are accustomed to act."' 8 5
American state corporation law has no counterpart to this Brit-
ish provision. Only under federal securities law, with its "con-
trolling persons" provisions, does American law attempt to
poke through form and inquire into substance.186
F. DISQUALIFICATION OF DIRECTORS AND OTHER MEANS OF
SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION
British law removes certain individuals from consideration
or service as directors of companies. Undischarged bankrupts
may not in the first instance serve as directors. 8 7 Though not
themselves bankrupt, directors also become disqualified from
service whenever two companies for which they were directors
become insolvent within a five-year period. This disqualifica-
tion lasts for five years.188 Moreover, courts can also remove di-
rectors who engaged in fraudulent acts or who persistently
have failed to comply with the Companies Acts.189 The Regis-
trar of Companies maintains a register of all directorships held
or which within the last five years have been held by directors
of British companies.190 The register aids members or their so-
licitors in determining whether grounds for background dis-
qualification exist.
In the United States, state corporation law again has no
counterpart to these British provisions. Virtually anyone can
serve as a director of a corporation.' 9 ' Only in certain limited
public offerings of securities conducted under exceptions to the
federal securities laws do background disqualifications for pro-
moters or directors exist. 92 Of course, promoters of dubious
185. CA. 1980 § 63.
186. Securities Act of 1933 § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1976); Securities Act of 1934
§ 20, 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1976). See also Sommer, Who's in Control 21 Bus. LAW.
559 (1966).
187. See L.C.B. GOWER, supra note 5, at 142.
188. Under the procedures set forth in the Insolvency Act of 1976, the official
receiver of the second insolvent corporation files an application with the court,
which then issues an order disqualifying the director. Insolvency Act, 1976, ch.
60, § 9.
189. C.A. 1948 § 188, amended by CA. 1976 § 28 and CA 1981 § 93. Further-
more, a court can remove a director in a single case of another company's insol-
vency. In that case, the person "shall not.., be a director of or in any way,
whether directly or indirectly, be concerned or take part in the promotion, for-
mation, or management of a company." Insolvency Act, 1976, ch. 60, § 9,
amended by CA. 1981 § 94.
190. CA 1948 § 200, amended by CA. 1981 § 95.
191. See, e.g., MBCA § 35 (directors "need not be residents of this State or
shareholders of the corporation"; no other potential restrictions listed).
192. Pursuant to Securities Act of 1933 § 3(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (Supp. IV
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backgrounds can operate outside the effective reach of federal
securities laws. Indeed they can also comport with federal se-
curities law by acting under other registration exemptions for
securities offerings where background disqualifications do not
exist.193
In addition to the protection afforded members by back-
ground disqualifications for directors, British law allows mem-
bers to object to alterations in the company's objects or
purposes clause.194 Upon petition by fifteen percent or more of
the company's share capital, the court may confirm or reject,
wholly or in part, the alteration. Furthermore, the court can or-
der the company to purchase the objecting members' shares.195
Since the ultra vires doctrine remains strong in Britain, and
since a company must state its objects with specificity,196 the
right to object can give minority share interests a significant
control over management. Management may not be able to di-
versify or change the nature of the company's business as long
as an unhappy minority exists within the company.
In the United States a number of commentators have ex-
amined section 210 of the Companies Act 1948.197 Section 210
gives British courts broad powers to order relief for share-
holder minorities who prove oppression by majority share in-
terests. The court may "make such order[s] as it thinks fit,"
including orders for regulating the future conduct of the com-
1980), the SEC may exempt from registration offerings up to $5 million.
Through so-called Regulation A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.251-64 (1982), the SEC exempts
offerings up to $1.5 million. 17 C.F.R. § 230.254 (1982). Yet, the SEC denies use
of the exemption where background disqualifications apply to any director, of-
ficer, general partner, or promoter. The disabling events are, inter alia, securi-
ties law criminal convictions in the past ten years, civil orders or decrees in the
past five years, or entry of certain United States Postal Service fraud orders.
Id. § 230.252(d). Through SEC Rule 505, the SEC exempts from registration of-
ferings up to $5 million sold to 35 persons plus "accredited investors." The
same Regulation A background disqualifications apply. Id. § 230.505(b) (2) (iii).
See also Investment Co. Act of 1940 § 9, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-9 (1976) (background
disqualifications for persons affiliated with investment companies).
193. Rule 505 background disqualifications, supra note 192, do not apply to
smaller offerings under the companion Rule 504, limited to $500,000 but with no
limit on the number of purchasers. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (1982). Similarly, pro-
moters' or directors' backgrounds do not directly affect offerings under the in-
trastate exemption, Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a) (11), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (11)
(1976).
194. C.A. 1948 §§ 5, 10, amended by C-A. 1980 § 90(3), sched. 3.
195. Id.
196. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
197. See, e.g., Folk, Corporation Statutes: 1956-66, 1966 DUKE I J. 875, 954-57;
Hetherington & Dooley, lliquidity and Exploitation.: A Proposed Statutory So-
lution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. I REV. 1, 24-26
(1977) (§ 210 deemed "paternalistic").
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pany's affairs, purchase of shares by other members or by the
company, or alteration of the company's memorandum or arti-
cles. Hence, section 210 is seen as an important adjunct or al-
ternative to a court's power to dissolve, or "wind up," a
corporation.
Judicial power to wind up exists both in the United States
and in Great Britain. 98 In the United States, however, courts
have seen dissolution as a doomsday weapon which they are
accordingly loathe to use. The problem is exacerbated by the
American courts' view that oppression and deadlock are black
and white propositions: the court can either dissolve the entity
or retain the status quo. American courts rarely exercise any
inherent equity power to make more subtle adjustments in
these cases.199
In Britain, section 210 fills the void which exists in the
United States between the extremes of black and white. Sec-
tion 210, however, also gives members in a British company a
check on management power, although commentators usually
have viewed the section as a solution to an extreme situation
rather than as a check or lever that the minority share interests
can use short of deadlock or actual oppression.
Recent amendments to section 210 enhance these share-
holder protections. The new enactment enables a member of a
company to seek section 210 relief whenever the company's af-
fairs are being conducted in a manner which is "unfairly preju-
dicial to the interests of some part of the members."200 Before,
British courts could only regulate a company's affairs in cases
of oppression, defined as "burdensome, harsh and wrongful"
management conduct.201 Courts now can also intervene in
"cases where the member complains of matters falling short of
dishonesty or oppression which have nevertheless resulted in
his interests being unfairly treated."202
198. Compare MBCA § 94 (involuntary dissolution) with CA 1948 § 222
(winding up by the court if 'just and equitable" to do so).
199. A classic exposition is Israels, The Sacred Cow of Corporate Existence:
Problems of Deadlock and Dissolution, 19 U. CHL L. REv. 778 (1952). Since Is-
raels wrote, American attitudes have not changed appreciably. See, e.g., Baker
v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 264 Or. 614, 507 P.2d 387 (1973) (oppressive
conduct found but no relief granted); Henry George & Sons v. Cooper-George,
Inc., 95 Wash. 2d 944, 952, 632 P.2d 512, 516 (1981) (in dissolution of close corpo-
ration court must still weigh "consequences... to the public at large"; no re-
lief granted or adjustment made).
200. CA. 1980 § 75(1).
201. Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society, Ltd. v. Meyer, [1959] AC. 324,
342, [1958] 3 All E. 66, 71.
202. NORTHEY & LEIGH, supra note 100, at 214.
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G. SUMMING Up THE FIRST TWO COUNTERTRENDS-MODEL ACT
REVISION AND BRITISH COMPANY LAw REFORM
In the United States, statutory drafters have tended to
think and act only in terms of increased flexibility for corporate
management. In Great Britain, companies act drafters have be-
gun to think in terms of expanded rights for share interests
who can thereby limit management power. Beyond such gov-
ernance aspects, British drafters have also sought to impose
absolute substantive control over the emoluments and perqui-
sites management can receive. With each new companies act,
disclosure requirements applicable to all companies as a mat-
ter of company law have made more information available to
company members and to the public. New British substantive
provisions on the raising and maintaining of capital not only
protect existing share interests but also aid in preventing the
sale of blue sky to the public.
This less than comprehensive review of companies acts in
1967, 1976, 1980, and 1981 demonstrates that, whatever the mer-
its of particular company law enactments, since Professor
Gower compared British and American schemes nearly three
decades ago the comparison has shifted diametrically. Britain
has replaced the theme of complete consensualty with a
number of substantive and other controls over corporate man-
agements. On the other hand, the leading American endeavor
has abandoned nearly all substantive control. Only fiduciary
duty stands between shareholders and complete management
arrogation of power. This sole safeguard, upon which the pro-
posed American Revised Model Act now so steadfastly stands,
in many cases may have become a mirage. In the United
States, corporate directors have the ultimate enabling device-
the directors' power to terminate derivative actions. "Consen-
sual and enabling" has come to mean far more than the phrase
ever meant under the Companies Act. Especially against the
backdrop of developments in company law in the last fifteen
years, American corporation law appears to be on the verge of
flexibility's finest hour.
III. A THIRD COUNTERTREND: THE AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE
In 1977-78 the American Law Institute (ALl) and the Amer-
ican Bar Association (ABA) held a series of conferences on
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corporation law.2 03 Out of those conferences 204 grew Principles
of Corporale Governance and Structure: Restatement and Rec-
ommendations, Tentative Draft No. 1 (Corporate Governance),
which appeared in April 1982.205
A. OVERVIEW OF THE THRD COUNTERTREND
To an extent, the ALI project purports to be a "restatement
of existing law."206 In addition, however, the document is also
to be a "'prestatement' of what the law should be" and, short of
a legal mandate, "a guide to how corporations should conduct
their affairs."207 Thus, the ALI endeavor is unlike past Ameri-
can Law Institute projects. Other restatements attempt to im-
prove "black letter formulations" in certain areas of law,
buttressing these formulations with "refinement of analysis."2 0
Those restatements take positions on issues around which con-
troversy may swirl. In so doing, however, the ALI seeks to
make incremental rather than revolutionary changes in ex-
panses of law which have for the most part found widespread
support. Restatements attempt articulation, enhanced clarity,
and incremental improvement of existing law. The ALI corpo-
ration law project departs significantly from that traditional
ALI format.209
Corporate Governance also abandons traditional reform
modes in the corporation law area. It does not seek to develop
or refine discrete affirmative commands or prohibitions, as Brit-
ish company law has done. Nor does it delete command and
prohibition in favor of general principle and flexibility, as many
American state corporation laws have done.2 10 Instead, Corpo-
rate Governance seeks to dictate structure and process. The
ALI reporters apparently believe that from structure and pro-
203. COMMENTARIES ON CORPORATE STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE: THE AU-
ABA Symposiums 1977-78 (D. Schwartz ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as COMMEN-
TARIES]. See also AMERICAN LAw INsTrruTE, 1982 ANNUAL REPORT 13 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as 1982 REPORT].
204. ALI Report No. 3, at 1 (1980).
205. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
206. ABA Section on Corporation, Banking and Business Law, 2 Business
Law Memo No. 5, at 7 (1982).
207. Id. For those reasons, the ALI Council is considering dropping the
word "Restatement" from the title of the project. R. Perkins, Remarks at a Fo-
rum of The Association of the Bar of the City of New York 12 (March 14, 1983)
[hereinafter cited as ALI President Perkins' Speech].
208. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS forward, at viii (1981).
209. See, e.g., Wechsler, Report of the Director, in 1982 REPORT, supra note
203, at 5-8. Cf. id. at 15 (Corporate Governance is a new "art form" for ALI).
210. See supra notes 34-95 and accompanying text.
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cess will come an increased likelihood of achieving the benefits
and results which neither discrete prohibitions nor general
principles previously have been able to produce in the Ameri-
can corporate sphere.
1. Background of the ALI Endeavor
Corporate Governance has had its precursors. Under
Chairman Harold Williams, the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) adopted positions on a number of structure and
process issues. Chairman Williams repeatedly urged that save
for the chief executive officer all corporate directors should be
independent of management. Corporate officers, employees, in-
vestment and commercial bankers, lawyers, and similar affili-
ated persons were not to serve on boards of directors. 21 ' In
addition, the SEC promulgated for comment rules which would
have required the annual proxy statements to identify directors
as either "management," "affiliated non-management," or "in-
dependent." 212 Detailed disclosures on compensation, perqui-
sites, and services to the corporation as consultants or
independent contractors would fill proxy statements. The goal
was to enable investment analysts, and possibly shareholders
as well, to evaluate the board's level of independence. 2 3 Last
of all, in agreeing to enter into consent decrees for traditional
securities law violations, the Commission foisted upon defend-
ant corporations ancillary measures dealing with structure. In
order to avoid protracted litigation with the SEC; corporate de-
fendants agreed to installation of independent directors, in-
dependent audit and nominating committees of the board,
limitations on perquisites, and more.2 14 The SEC's oblique
211. See, e.g., H. Williams, Corporate Accountability and Corporate Power,
Fairless Lecture, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh (Oct. 24, 1979), sum-
marized in SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 526, at A-1 (Oct. 31, 1979); H. Wil-
liams, Corporate Accountability, Address to Fifth Annual Securities Regulation
Institute, San Diego (Jan. 18, 1978), summarized in SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA)
No. 437, at A-22 (Jan. 25, 1978).
212. SEC Securities Act Release No. 14,970 (July 18, 1978).
213. Id. Most of the proposals were dropped after vociferous objection from
business. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 15,385 (Dec. 6, 1978). More re-
cently, the SEC has proposed further reduction of disclosure in this area. See
Hudson, SEC Proposes Reducing Data that Firms Must Report on Executives'
Compensation, Wall St. J., Jan. 14, 1983, at 5, col. 2.
214. See Kripke, The SEC, Corporate Governance, and the Real Issues, 36
Bus. LAw 173, 193-205 (1981) ("[T] he staff zealously ... [loads] the settlement
with provisions about corporate governance, and the respondent shrugs his
shoulders. The settlement, whittled down as best they can by the respondents,
is then-so far as appearances go-'offered' by the respondent and 'accepted'
... by the Commission.").
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movement into internal corporate affairs stopped with the
change from a Democratic to a Republican administration. Ap-
pointment of a new SEC chairman brought about a shift in
emphasis.
Another precursor of Corporate Governance has been en-
deavor in academe, particularly the work of Professor Melvin
Eisenberg. Professor Eisenberg wrote a series of articles cul-
minating in Legal Models of Management Structure in the Mod-
ern Corporation: Officers, Directors, and Accountants.2 1 For
Professor Eisenberg, structure and process rather than com-
mand or general principle became the solution.2 16 Professor Ei-
senberg is the reporter of three of the existent five parts of
Corporate Governance, including the heart of the document,
Part EII, "Structure of the Corporation."2 1 7
2. Corporate Governance-Parts I-HI
a. The Monitoring Model
The heart of Corporate Governance has been the imposi-
tion of the so-called monitoring model. Traditionally, corpora-
tion law has affirmatively provided that "the business and
affairs of a corporation shall be managed by a board of direc-
tors."21 8 In large corporations especially, that formulation does
not accord with reality. Corporate officers, not the board of di-
rectors, generally manage the corporation's business and af-
fairs. Typically the board of directors meets bimonthly or
quarterly to review or contribute to management's decisions. A
fast-paced business world filled with complex choices does not,
and cannot, permit management by a group such as the board,
or the leisure of decisionmaking on a bimonthly or quarterly
basis.
In 1975, the ABA Committee on Corporate Laws amended
the MBCA to take reality into account. The MBCA shifted to
215. 63 CALIF. L. REV. 375 (1975). Earlier pieces in the series by Professor
Eisenberg are The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern
Corporate Decisionmaking, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1969); Access to the Corporate
Proxy Machinery, 83 HAv. L. REV. 1489 (1970); and Megasubsidiaries: The Ef-
fect of Corporate Structure on Corporate Control 84 HARv. L. REV. 1577 (1971).
Professor Eisenberg later refined the analysis of that series. MA. EISENBERG,
THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORA ON: A LEGAL ANALYSIS (1976).
216. "Corporate law is constitutional law; that is, its dominant function is to
regulate the manner in which the corporate institution is constituted ..
MA. EISENBERG, supra note 215, at 1.
217. See CORPORATE GovERNANCE, supra note 3, at v.
218. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 717 (McKinney 1963); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 22-701 (1968); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-24 (1955).
1983]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
the proviso that "[a]ll corporate powers shall be exercised by
or under the authority of, and the business and affairs of a cor-
poration shall be managed under the direction of, a board of di-
rectors." 219 The change from a simple imperative to a softer
formulation recognized that the board's proper role is supervi-
sion, review, and policy making. Gone was the traditional com-
mand: "Thou Shalt Manage."
The monitoring model builds upon these developments.
Corporate Government installs yet another command:
"[M]anagement of the business ... shall be conducted," not
by the board of directors, as of old, and not under "the author-
ity of" a board of directors, as in recent times, but "by or under
the supervision of such senior executives as may be designated
by the board of directors ..... ,220 In turn the role of directors
becomes nearly wholly "'monitoring,' in its sense of to observe
carefully and oversee."22 1 In fact, with one exception, "manag-
ing" is to be "separated from the function of monitoring man-
agement."222 The exception states that the board of directors
shall retain the power of initiative, as well as the responsibility,
to "[s] elect, evaluate, remove, and replace the principal senior
executives." 223 To a large degree, Corporate Governance
reduces the board's plenary power, substituting the doomsday
weapons of selection and removal.
Under the monitoring model, in its relationship with man-
agement the board of directors assumes a role not unlike the
role shareholders play with respect to the board. Under corpo-
ration law, shareholders have little power to determine a firm's
courses of action and still less power of initiative. Shareholders
do have the ultimate weapon, however. If the course of corpo-
rate events has not pleased a majority of shareholders, the ma-
jority can remove and replace the directors. 224 Similarly, under
the monitoring model, if management has not pleased the di-
rectors, the board's central function is not to interfere in indi-
vidual decisions but to evaluate, and if necessary replace,
senior management.
219. MBCA § 35 (1975).
220. CoiuorATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 3, § 3.01 (emphasis added).
221. Id. § 3.02 comment a, at 59.
222. Id.
223. Id. § 3.02(a) (1).
224. The tableau is well described by In re Auer v. Dressel, 306 N.Y. 427, 118
N.E.2d 590 (1954). See also Annot., 48 A.L.R.2D 615 (1956) (remedies to restrain
or compel holding of stockholders' meeting).
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b. Independent Directors
The monitoring model suggests or installs several devices
to insure that boards of directors can effectively implement
their new roles. A majority of directors in a corporation must
be independent, that is, "free of any significant relationships
with the corporation's senior executives."22 5 Investment or
commercial bankers and lawyers who do business with the cor-
poration, traditional candidates for service on the board, would
not be free of significant relationships. 226 As directors, there-
fore, they could not be counted in testing the independence of
a majority of directors. In addition, candidates with "extremely
close personal relationships [with senior management] or sig-
nificant interlocking directorships" could serve as directors but
could not count in meeting the majority of independent direc-
tors requirement.227
To insure selection of truly independent directors, Corpo-
rate Governance removes the traditional power of management
to nominate directors from where it has traditionally lodged, in
management, principally in the chief executive officer. The
monitoring model requires a nominating committee.228 The
committee is to be "composed exclusively of directors who are
not officers or employees of the corporation."22 9 Nominating
committees, and not senior managements, will identify and test
the independence of candidates for the board.230
Once in place, the independent directors on the board
should have at their disposal the wherewithal to evaluate man-
agement's stewardship. Corporate Governance thus makes
clear the power of independent directors "[t] o retain separate
counsel, accountants, or other expert assistance.., and to in-
cur reasonable fees and charges at the corporation's ex-
225. CoRPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 3, § 3.03(a). In February 1983, the
AU Council voted to delete the requirement as mandatory. It will remain in
the document as "good corporate practice." ALI President Perkins' Speech,
supra note 207, at 11.
226. Empirical evidence shows that at times those sources have accounted
for one-fifth of the directors in large publicly held firms. See, e.g., Smith, Inter-
locking Directorates Among the 'Fortune 500; ANTnrUST L & ECON. REV., Sum-
mer 1970, 47, 48-49 (survey of directors in 495 largest companies).
227. Com OATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 3, § 3.03 comment d, at 76.
228. Section 3.06(a) of the current draft of Corporate Governance provides
that "every large corporation shall have a nominating committee," but subse-
quent drafts are expected to delete this requirement. See ALI President Per-
kins' Speech, supra note 207, at 20, 23.
229. CoRPoRATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 3, § 3.06(a) (1).
230. Id. § 3.06 comment d, at 103-06.
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pense. ''231 Coupled with their power "[t]o inspect corporate
records and interview corporate counsel and other person-
nel," 232 the independent directors' authority to retain experts
should enhance their ability to evaluate management in sensi-
tive as well as complex settings. Traditionally, the board as a
whole had the authority to retain experts, but no subset of di-
rectors clearly had this power.233
c. The Audit Committee
As a further means of aiding directors in evaluating corpo-
rate management, Corporate Governance mandates installation
of an audit committee. The audit committee is to be "com-
posed exclusively of directors who have no significant relation-
ships with the corporation's senior executives." 234 The
monitoring model would be nearly impossible to implement if
management retained power to select the corporation's outside
auditors. Management could sift through the ranks of auditing
firms until it found a pliable auditor who would present to the
independent board the financial picture management wants to
present.235 Even if management cannot freely change auditors,
under the present system management can select from the
available array of accounting principles that principle best cal-
culated to disguise or conceal a managementfaux pas or more
serious failure.236
The monitoring model's audit committee would have the
power to review auditors' independence, the scope of audits,
the adequacy of internal accounting controls, and "[a]ny dis-
putes between management and the independent auditor."237
In addition, the audit committee rather than management
would decide any "material question" as to "the appropriate ac-
counting principles ... to be used in preparation of the corpo-
ration's financial statements." 238  Increasingly, audit
231. Id. § 3.04(b).
232. Id. § 3.04(c).
233. Id. § 3.04 comment a, at 80.
234. CoRPoRATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 3, § 3.05(1).
235. The SEC has, however, undertaken several steps to strengthen audi-
tors' independence from management. For example, whenever a reporting
company's auditor is dismissed or resigns, the company must fie Form 8K, re-
porting any disagreements between the auditor and management in the prior
two years, including disagreements resolved to the auditor's satisfaction. SEC
Securities Act Release No. 5550 (Dec. 20, 1974).
236. For illustrations of this phenomenon, see Briloff, "We Often Paint
Fakes," 28 VAND. L. Rxv. 165 (1975).
237. CoRPoRAT GOVERNANCE, supra note 3, § 3.05(a) (2) (E) (iii).
238. Id. § 3.05(a) (2) (F). For a description of an audit committee's work, see
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committees have been viewed as a means of heightening audi-
tors' independence from senior management. Corporate Gov-
ernance envisions the audit committee as a means also to
heighten the directors' independence from the corporation's
management. The audit committee would give the independent
board its own power to set standards regarding the integrity of
the information the board will use in evaluating management.
3. Corporate Governance-The Remaining Parts
The heart of Corporate Governance, the monitoring model,
emphasizes a more independent board of directors with a
newly defined, or newly emphasized, set of responsibilities. In
placing such reliance on the board, the ALI must re-examine
general principles which brood over the new model or struc-
ture. Part IV does so by restating and, in small ways, reinforc-
ing the fiduciary duty of care. Corporate Governance leaves
the other prong of fiduciary duty, the duty of loyalty, for a sub-
sequent craft.239
Part IV of Corporate Governance makes clear that corpo-
rate officers as well as corporate directors operate under the
standard of care.240 The ALI comments and examples also
make clear that the duty of care carries with it some modicum
of skill. Thus, the duty of care conjures up "the image of a
generalist who has the basic intelligence appropriate to the
task at hand."241 Examples make it clear that "'a weak head' is
not a defense: the slow witted or foolish will be held to an ob-
jective standard."242 Reflecting the opposite view, the 1975
MBCA codification of a standard of care deleted skill from the
usual common law formulation.243 Common law rubrics to the
contrary, the MBCA comments deny that skill has ever been
an ingredient of the standard of care.244
Corporate Governance also attempts to eliminate any
"blind eye" defense to an alleged duty of care violation. In or-
der to comply with the ALI standard of care, directors and of-
Green & Falk, The Audit Committee-A Measured Contribution to Corporate
Governance: A Realistic Appraisal of Its Objectives and Functions, 34 Bus.
LAw. 1229 (1979).
239. Part IV is itself incomplete. The causation section, § 4.04, has not yet
been drafted. See CoRPoRATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 3, at 202, 216.
240. Id. § 4.01 comment a, at 148.
241. Id. at 158.
242. Id. at 160, example 3.
243. See MCBA § 35.
244. See 32 Bus. LAw. 41,44 (1976). Cf. Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 65 (1880).
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ficers must make "reasonable inquiry" into corporate affairs.245
Furthermore, directors must be "reasonably concerned with
the existence and effectiveness of monitoring programs, includ-
ing law compliance programs" within the corporation. 246
Last of all, Corporate Governance, Part IV, section 4.01(d),
codifies the business judgment rule. Courts will not second-
guess or review the merits of board decisions made in good
faith and with the requisite care.247 Corporate Governance,
though, fleshes out the prerequisites that exist for entry into
the safe harbor that the business judgment rule represents.
First, for entry into the safe harbor, directors must have
made "an informed decision and reasonable inquiry."248 The
business judgment rule does not protect from review decisions
other than "deliberative decisions" because no judgment has
been exercised by the board.249 Directors who rubberstamp or
sleep through management decisions cannot gain the rule's
protections. Second, directors cannot enter the safe harbor if
they have a "disabling" conflict of interest.250 The business
judgment rule, of course, never has applied to conflicts of inter-
est.251 Courts can and should review the propriety of directors'
decisions which confer a benefit on directors, their families, or
their friends and associates. When a conflict of interest is in-
volved, directors cannot shield the decision from scrutiny on
the ground that the board exercised care in reaching its deci-
sion.252 Finally, in order to enter the business judgment rule
safe harbor, directors must have a "rational basis" for the chal-
lenged decision.253 Although the directors' decision need not
245. CoRPoRATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 3, § 4.01(b).
246. Id.
247. "[A] Board of Directors acting in good faith and with reasonable care
and diligence, who nevertheless fall into a mistake, either as to law or fact, are
not liable for the consequences of such mistake." Hodges v. New England
Screw Co., 3 R.I. 9, 18 (1853), quoted in Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Re-
visited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 93, 99 (1979).
248. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 3, § 4.01(d) comment b, at 205.
249. Id. at 195. A subsequent draft, however, is expected to eliminate the
word "deliberative" in describing the kinds of decisions protected by the busi-
ness judgment rule. All President Perkins' Speech, supra note 207, at 9.
250. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 3, § 4.01(d) (2).
251. See, e.g., Arsht, supra note 247, at 101-111.
252. A shortcoming, however, is that Corporate Governance does not define
"disabling" conflicts of interest. For example, a director who serves on another
corporation's board does not know whether every corporate transaction with
that other corporation can be subjected to plenary review by a court. The
forthcoming Part VI apparently will attempt to define the term, but in a section
remote from the business judgment rule codification. See CORPORATE GOVERN-
ANCE, supra note 3, § 4.01(d) comment c, at 208.
253. Id. § 4.01(d) (3).
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be reasonable, in the colloquial, directors must at least have
had a peg on which to hang their hats. They must be able to
point to a reason for their decision. So long as that reason is
not unconnected with reality, under Corporate Governance a
court will not review the business wisdom of the decision.25 4
Corporate Governance's longest chapter, Part VII, deals
mainly with derivative actions and the power of the board to
dismiss them. In effect the chapter retains the recently rein-
carnated directorial power to cause dismissal by declaring that
the derivative action is "adverse or detrimental to the corpora-
tion's best interests."25 5 In so doing, however, Corporate Gov-
ernance adopts the intermediate position developed by the
Delaware Supreme Court,256 but which only a minority of other
courts have followed.257 Thus, under Corporate Governance, al-
though the power to dismiss exists, "the decision to terminate"
a derivative action is not merely "but another application of the
business judgment rule."25 8 The court can review the "busi-
ness justification" a committee of directors has advanced for
dismissal.259 Under the majority business judgment rationale,
of course, a court would limit itself to a review of the litigation
committee's independence as an indicia of good faith and the
diligence and scope of the committee's work as an indicia of
care. A court following the Corporate Governance approach
would also review the merits or reasonableness of the justifica-
tion advanced for dismissal.260
B. C~rMiCISM OF Corporate Governance-A BOOTSTRAP
Corporate Governance chooses one corporation law reform
proposal, the monitoring model, from among the many which
have surfaced in the last eight to ten years.261 With no empiri-
254. See id. § 4.01(d) comment e, at 209-11.
255. Id. § 7.03(c).
256. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (1981).
257. See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom.
103 S. Ct. 1498 (1983).
258. CompoRAT GovERNMACE, supra note 3, § 7.03 comment a, at 304.
259. Id. § 7.02(c) (ii). An exception exists when the action is against a third
party, in contrast to a "corporate fiduciary." In those cases the board's judg-
ment will be protected by the business judgment rule. See id. § 7.03(a) (i). The
rationale is that "[a] decision to terminate a derivative action against a third
party or a low level corporate employee represents little potential for abuse."
Id. § 7.03 comment a, at 304.
260. See, e.g., id. § 7.03 comment d, at 325-329.
261. Among the proposals advanced for corporate reform are federal char-
tering, see supra notes 1, 8, and accompanying text; corporate uniformity stat-
utes, see Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83
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cal evidence, Corporate Governance labels that proposal "a ma-
jor trend."262 From this "trend," Corporate Governance
extrapolates what "good corporate practice" is. In many in-
stances, the ALI draft goes even further, suggesting that failure
to live up to the monitoring model's dictates would be relevant
in determining whether or not a corporation is complying with
existing law, regardless of whether any state ever codifies the
monitoring model.263 Despite the merit or lack of merit in a
monitoring model, Corporate Governance's espousal of it is a
bootstrap of considerable proportions.
The bootstrap is not evident to all-a mass of detail
shrouds it. The reader gets the impression that the ALI report-
ers attempted to focus debate on individual trees, this or that
detail, while successfully pushing an entire forest, the monitor-
ing model, past the ALI Council. Thus, Corporate Governance
reads like an operating manual, the like of which few, if any,
corporations have ever included in bylaws or elsewhere. It
warns, for example, that
[c]are should be taken that the assumption or imposition of additional
board functions, other than by law, not compromise the monitoring
function by injecting the board into management. However, whether a
given function should be treated as ordinary management in any given
corporation is ultimately a matter to be determined by the judgment of
the board.2 6 4
Filled with detail, the commentary reads like specifications for
a machine.
[W]hile § 3.03(b) does not require that a majority of the boards of sec-
ond tier and demonstrably owner controlled first tier corporations be
YALE L. J. 663 (1974); and corporate social accounting and disclosure, see Bran-
son, Progress in the Art of Social Accounting and Other Arguments for Disclo-
sure on Corporate Social Responsibility, 29 VAND. L REV. 539 (1976). For a
summary of other proposals, see generally id. at 659-68 (public interest direc-
tors, one shareholder one vote, broadened public interest proxy solicitation
rule, and other proposals).
262. CORPORATE GovERNANCE, supra note 3, § 3.02 comment a, at 59. The
comments rely, for example, on a statement from the Corporate Directors
Guidebook; 33 Bus. LAw. 1591, 1621 (1978), that the "role of a director is to mon-
itor." CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 3, § 3.02 comment a, at 59. The Cor-
porate Directors Guidebook, of course, is altogether a horse of a different
stripe. It is a guide to be followed from within, rather than the source of a legal
standard to be imposed from outside, the corporation. Another principal
source of authority for a monitoring model is the ALI reporter's own work. See,
e.g., id. at 71 (citing M. EISENBERG, supra note 215).
263. See, e.g., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 3, §§ 3.05 comment a, at
86-87 (failure to have audit committee), 3.07 comment a, at 109 (failure to have a
compensation committee), 4.01 comment a, at 149 (standard of care as there set
out should be established by case law as following "principal doctrinal lines al-
ready established by state law").
264. Id. § 3.02 comment h, at 69-70.
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free of § 1.24 relationships, it does provide that these boards should
have at least three such directors. (The number three is chosen be-
cause it is regarded as the minimum number of directors necessary to
attain a critical mass on the board.)2 6 5
Moreover, the detail is often petty, at times stating the obvious
to anyone schooled in business affairs. It provides, for exam-
ple, that "[t]he term 'annual and quarterly financial state-
ments,' as used in § 3.05(a) (2) (E), encompasses annual and
quarterly statements filed with regulatory bodies (such as
Form 10-K) as well as those intended for issuance to sharehold-
ers and creditors."266 Such a detail adds little to the monitoring
model, yet by its mere presence may divert debate from under-
lying structure to the mass of detail.
The myriad specifications and details also give Corporate
Governance an intrusive aspect which has caused the business
community to view the ALI design as a wholesale invasion of
traditional management prerogatives. 2 67 Corporate managers
might well accept a few specific modifications to the present
corporate structure. Packed with excess baggage, as in Corpo-
rate Governance, however, even a few specific modifications
have little hope for winning acceptance. 268
One bootstrap aspect of Corporate Governance is while at
the same time Corporate Governance professes to restrict it ex-
pands the range of corporations it purports to cover. The pri-
mary focus is supposed to be upon "first tier" or "large publicly
held" corporations.269 Such companies, those with 2,000 or
more holders of equity securities and $100 million or more in
assets, 2 70 would be subject to the full panoply of ALI require-
ments. They would be required, for example, to have in place
an independent majority of directors, auditing and nominating
265. Id. § 3.03 comment c, at 74-75. For definitions of first and second tier
corporations, see infra notes 272-75 and accompanying text.
266. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 3, § 3.05 comment d, at 92 (docu-
ments audit committee is to review with independent auditor and
management).
267. See, e.g., id. § 3.02 comment d, at 64: "[TIhe board should also periodi-
cally excuse from the boardroom all directors who are senior executives, evalu-
ate the performance of the corporation's principal senior executives
individually and as a group, in a candid and reasonably thorough fashion, and
follow up on such evaluations ......
268. Cf. R. Smith, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of American Law Insti-
tute, 50 U.S.L.W. 2701, 2705 (June 1, 1982) (advice on good corporate practice is
a matter for groups like the Business Roundtable rather than the American
Law Institute).
269. See, e.g., CoRPoRATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 3, § 3.03 comment c, at 74
(first versus second tier).
270. Id. § 1.15.
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committees, and all other ingredients of the monitoring
model.27 ' For "second tier" corporations, publicly held compa-
nies with 500 or more persons holding a class of equity securi-
ties and having $3 million or more in assets,2 72 Corporate
Governance purports merely to suggest those requirements as
"good corporate practice" rather than as mandatory stan-
dards. 273 Yet what leeway the black letter provisions give the
official comments seem to take away. For example, without
qualification one comment states that "[b]ecause the audit
committee has become so prevalent it may be that, even where
the committee is not explicitly required by present law, its ab-
sence will bear upon subjecting a director to liability ... if the
corporation suffers a loss."274 This tendency to expand the
reach is reminiscent of the federal chartering movement which,
like Corporate Governance, seemed eager to expand and fill
every void even before it had gotten out of the gate.27 5
Last of all, Corporate Governance often adopts a sanctimo-
nious tone. For example, in attempting to be magnanimous,
Corporate Governance allows "[e]xercise of the management
function by the board on a regular basis.., in the case of sec-
ond-tier corporatons [sic]." It piously adds, however, that the
need to do so would be "relatively unusual" and that "[manage-
ment] by the board on a regular basis would not be good corpo-
rate practice even in a second-tier corporation." 276 At other
points, the document permits some variation from the model
only to add cautionary language as though addressing a
271. Id. §§ 3.03(a), 3.05(a), 3.06(a).
272. Id. § 1.21.
273. See., e.g., id. §§ 3.05(b) (audit committee), 3.06(b) (nominating
committee).
274. Id. § 3.05 comment a, at 86. See also id. § 4.01 comment b, at 152 ("mon-
itoring model" is "an irreducible minimum"). But see id. § 3.05 comment c, at
89.
275. Federal chartering proposed that "[ojnly the top thousand interstate
corporations ... would be chartered." Nader, The Case for Federal Chartering,
in CORPORATE POWER iN AM ERICA 67, 83 (R. Nader & M. Green eds. 1973). Be-
yond the largest corporations, however, it became necessary to require "a na-
tional franchise . . . of a smaller corporation if it wishes to do a significant
amount of business with the federal government, to operate . . . factories in
foreign countries, or to engage in certain industries where there is an existing,
overriding federal interest, such as energy and interstate transportation." Hen-
ning, Federal Corporate Chartering For Big Business: An Idea Whose Time Has
Come?, 21 DE PAuL L. REv. 915, 922 (1972).
276. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 3, § 3.02 comment h, at 70. In re-
sponse to extensive criticism, the ALI committee has changed this section to
permit active management by the board. ALI President Perkins' Speech, supra
note 207, at 20.
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child.277
In tone and in specific provision, Corporate Governance is
sanctimonious, intrusive, and a bootstrap. Those attributes will
severely limit Corporate Governance's influence with corporate
lawyers or business executives. Or, at a minimum, Corporate
Governance exudes an appearance of sanctimony and intru-
sion. Appearance often being as important as reality itself, as
presently structured Corporate Governance is not likely ever to
gain the currency and influence expected of work products of
the American Law Institute.
C. Corporate Governance- SUBSTANTrVE CrmCisM
Many of Corporate Governance's shortcomings are cos-
metic. In addition, however, there are more fundamental,
structural flaws. The monitoring model has as its intent height-
ening of differences between managements' and the boards' of
directors roles. Instead of aiding management and setting pol-
icy, boards are to "evaluate" and possibly "remove and replace"
senior management. 78 The board's role shifts from cooperative
oversight to an adversarial stance. Taken literally, the monitor-
ing model could result in paralyzing impasses between the
board and the chief executive officers. Large corporations
would lose the valuable service their directors can render
under the cooperative model.
Chief executive officers do look to directors for develop-
ment of policy, for counsel, and for reassurance.2 79 That is not
to say chief executives cannot procure advice and counsel else-
where. They can turn to professional counselors: the lawyers,
accountants, and bankers who serve the corporation. Lower
level managers can also provide the expertise which executive
officers need. A difficulty with those sources of advice is that
they often tend to be risk averse or, alternatively, simply not
capable of evaluating risk. The lawyer or banker may too often
view matters in black and white. Alternatively, they may have
tunnel vision, subliminally or consciously placing legal or
financial aspects in the ascendancy.280
277. See, e.g., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 3, § 3.05 comment e, at
94 ("In assigning additional functions to the [audit] committee, care should be
taken to avoid compromising its basic functions either by overloading the com-
mittee or by injecting it into operational matters.").
278. Id. § 3.02(a)(1).
279. See, e.g., R. MuEuLER, NEw DmEcTnoNs FOR DIRECTORS 103-05 (1978).
280. Indeed, materials for the academic training of lawyers are only begin-
ning to take note of these disabilities. See, e.g., J. DEuTscH & J. BiNco, THE
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By contrast, board members are often selected to serve be-
cause they have had more diverse exposure to business than
have bankers, accountants, or lower level corporate personnel.
Middle level executives may have spent their entire working
lives with the same or similar companies. Bankers or lawyers
may have had experiences with many companies, but only on a
superficial basis. Even though board members may be the last
to view a proposal as it passes up through the corporate hierar-
chy, board members can often bring a wider perspective to that
last stage. As near equals with the chief executive, directors
can discuss proposals and policies in terms of uncertainty or
shades of gray, aspects that other advisers often do not
address.
Corporate Governance's monitoring model would not, of
course, eliminate traditional board management functions
across the board. It may, however, result in inconsistent prac-
tices between firms. Some companies will adopt the monitor-
ing model literally. Others will pay only lip service to the new
structure. In between those extremes, corporations will pick
and choose the features of the structure that suit them best,
paying varying degrees of allegiance to the model as a whole.
There is no easy solution in tinkering with corporate governance,
transferring determination of the public interest to individual boards
for uneven decisions operating unfairly between competitors and un-
fairly against the stockholder risk-takers of those corporations....
[T]hat approach turns out to be a cop-out, a transfer of responsibility
to a group of Wise Elders in a utopia, thus attempting to short-circuit
the necessary effort to work for determination of the public interest in
a proper fashion.281
An apparent constant which would reduce the degree of
possible inconsistency is fiduciary duty. Duties of care and loy-
alty, or liability for the breach of them, serve as some incentive
to adopt and apply the monitoring model on an even and ear-
nest basis. Corporate Governance makes the point repeatedly,
at times on rather farfetched bases. Failure to have truly in-
dependent directors and functioning audit and nominating
LAW OF CORPORATIONS: WHAT CORPORATE LAWYERS Do (1976); Fitzgibbon, Syl-
labus Exchange: Representing the Business Client PROSPECTUS, Fall 1982, at 17-
20.
281. Kripke, supra note 214, at 184. Accord Werner, Corporation Law In
Search of its Future, 81 COLuM. L. REV. 1611, 1664 (1981):
How much greater is the danger to the shareholders in companies that
choose to follow the letter but not the spirit of the proposed modeL It
is no great trick to fashion a paper trail that allows presumably in-
dependent directors to shield managers who have subordinated share-
holder rights to their own interests.
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committees, as well as failure to implement faithfully other fea-
tures of the monitoring model, Corporate Governance tells its
reader, will "bear upon subjecting a director to liability"282 for
breach of fiduciary duty even under present law.2 83
The truth is that when fiduciary duty has been a sole safe-
guard, as opposed to a backup to a well-recognized substantive
command or prohibition, it has frequently not worked well.284
Whether phrased in a strong as well as a weak form,285 at best
fiduciary duty has produced inconsistent results. Recent cases
illustrate the point.
In the tender offer area, boards of directors obviously in-
tent upon preserving themselves in office have escaped all
sanction under fiduciary duty. In Panter v. Marshall Field &
Co.,286 the Field board surreptitiously decided not to be taken
over, no matter how high the price offered shareholders or how
long they had suffered a depressed market for shares. In a sub-
sequent derivative action based upon breach of the directors'
duty of loyalty, the court denied the shareholders' claims on
the basis that the business judgment rule barred review of the
board's actions. 287 The business judgment rule, however, prop-
erly applies only to duty of care claims and not to claims for
breach of a duty of loyalty.2 88
Even when the fiduciary principles courts enunciate are
sound, courts vary widely in the evidence they will accept and
the probity they will accord it. In the classic case of Cheff v.
Mathes,289 incumbent managers spent millions of corporate
dollars to buy off a possible threat to their control when, essen-
tially based upon rumor and on one telephone call, they had
determined that a "corporate looter" was seeking control. The
282. CoRpORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 3, § 3.05 comment a, at 86.
283. See, e.g., id. §§ 3.02 comment b, at 60 (independent directors), 3.05 com-
ment a, at 86 (audit committee), 3.06 comment b, at 101 (nominating commit-
tee), 3.07 comment b, at 109 (compensation committee).
284. An example might be where the statutory pre-emptive right of share-
holders is backed by directors' duty of loyalty applicable to share issuances.
See, e.g., Ross Transp., Inc. v. Crothers, 185 Md. 573, 45 A.2d 267 (Ct. App. 1946).
285. For weak versus strong statements, see supra notes 29-39 and accom-
panying text
286. 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
287. Id. at 293-97. See also Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 381 (2d
Cir. 1980) (issuances of shares to dilute tender offeror's position upheld under
business judgment rule). Cf. Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 43 Del. Ch.
353, 364, 230 A.2d 769, 776 (1967) (share issuance to thwart a tender offer struck
down because, inter alia, no "methodical investigation").
288. Arsht & Hinney, Codified Standard-Same Harbor But Charted Chan-
neLk A Response, 35 Bus. LAw. 947 (1980).
289. 41 DeL Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964).
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court held that management had acted in good faith and in
what they had believed to be the corporation's best interests. 290
Recently, some corporate boards have approved high
amounts of severance pay for management, and in some cases
for nonmanagement directors as well, after a successful corpo-
rate takeover.29 1 Opinion is that the business judgment rule
may also protect such "golden parachutes" from scrutiny based
upon breach of fiduciary duty claims.
Fiduciary duty has worked well in other cases, leading to
liability, or to protection, of directors and officers whose actions
shareholders have challenged.292 The best that can be said,
however, is that fiduciary duty produces inconsistent results.
Perhaps it should never be relied upon as the front line de-
fense against all abuse of office by corporate officers and direc-
tors. Instead, fiduciary duty may serve best as an
omnipresence which fills voids in, or serves as a backup to, sub-
stantive command and prohibition.293 Corporate Governance's
stress on structure and process combined with fiduciary duty
may lead to no greater consistency than does reliance upon
structure and process alone.
Corporate Governance abandons substantive law in favor
of organizational structure and fiduciary duty. The Revised
Model Business Corporation Act, too, abandons substantive
command or prohibition. It opts instead for greater flexibility
with fiduciary duty as the only real control.2 94 Recent British
company law reform represents a third countertrend. Parlia-
290. Id. at 508, 199 A.2d at 556-57.
291. See, e.g., Klein, A Golden Parachute Protects Executives, But Does It
Hinder or Foster Takeovers?, Wall St. J., Dec. 8, 1982, at 56, col. 1.
292. See, e.g., Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218 (Del. 1976) (usurpation of a
corporate opportunity not automatically protected by safe harbor statute);
Kamin v. American Express Co., 86 Misc.2d 809, 383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1976), affid mem., 54 A.D.2d 654, 387 N.Y.S.2d 993 (1976) (directors' decision to
pay dividend in kind rather than sell asset at a loss protected by business judg-
ment rule).
293. In the trust area, over the centuries fiduciary duty has spawned a
number of discrete common law rules over which general principles of fiduci-
ary duty brood as an omnipresence. See, e.g., 2 A. ScoTt, THE LAW OF TRusTs
§ 170.1-.25 (3d ed. 1967) (applications of the duty of loyalty). In the corporation
law area, statutory commands or prohibitions have previously served a similar
function. American corporation law reform has, however, over the last decade
taken the form of easing or erasing those statutory rules, substituting general
principles of fiduciary duty. See supra notes 30-77 and accompanying text. In
contrast, in corporation law, fiduciary duty has not spawned a great number of
discrete common law prohibitions. Corporation law, therefore, is left with only
a handful of general fiduciary principles to govern an area of vast applicability.
A void exists.
294. See supra notes 84-93 and accompanying text.
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ment has chosen to return to substantive regulation in many
areas of company law. 295 Perhaps in lieu of or in addition to
structure, the ALI should consider revision and restatement of
some discrete corporation law commands that over the years
have fallen by the wayside.2 96
IV. TO WHAT ENDS CORPORATION LAW REFORM?
Before adopting any course of action, the ALI, the ABA, or
other reformer must devote additional thought to what it is
they are attempting to achieve. There has been much discus-
sion about goals for corporation law, much of it muddied, most
of it contradictory, and some of it simply not connected with re-
ality. That discussion has served to confuse rather than resolve
the issue of what ends corporation law should serve. Before
the reform and revision processes began, no consensus had
been reached or single issue resolved,297 save a determination
by a number of individuals that something should be done.
A. LAw AND ECONOMICS AND MARKET MODELS
One group, however, vigorously dissents even from that
view. The law and economics group animus is that
[t]he purpose of corporation law is to provide a set of organizing prin-
ciples under which private parties can enter into contractual arrange-
ments that maximize their joint welfare. The function of corporation
law, therefore, is rather limited. Apart from minimizing transaction
295. See supra notes 93-199 and accompanying text.
296. In support of such a course of action it has been said that
the public interest and its lawful demands on the corporation...
should take the form of prohibition of action by law.., or encourage-
ment of action by command.... And public policy should be mani-
fested comprehensively with fairness among competitors and among
groups of shareholders.., not by the possibly inconsistent determina-
tions of independent groups of private persons who... [find] them-
selves in control of different individual corporations.
I do not have to have explained to me the case against too much
government interference with business. There is too much legislation,
a poor legislative process, overregulation, and unsatisfactory public ad-
ministration.... But the necessary course is to fight for their im-
provement. There is no easy solution in tinkering with corporate
governance.
Kripke, supra note 214, at 184 (citations omitted).
297. See, e.g., COMMENTARIES, supra note 203. The speeches recorded
therein range from complacent, see Farrell, Corporations Are Already
Overgoverned, id. at 188; to mildly progressive, see Kaplan, Fair Treatment of
Shareholders, id. at 215; to somewhat strident, see Schwartz, The Paradigm of
Federal Chartering, id. at 325, and Green, Attainment of Social Goals Requires
Corporate Reform, id. at 265. All seem to do little more than resemble anecdo-
tal after-dinner speeches, certainly not an adequate empirical foundation for a
major restatement of corporation law.
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costs and possibly facilitating the operation of market forces that disci-
pline management, corporation law has little role to play.2 9 8
The law and economics group does not believe that corpo-
ration law needs any change, save perhaps eliminating even
more of the constraints the law imposes on corporate manage-
ments. To members of this group, the market for shares pro-
vides all the protection shareholders need. If shareholders do
not approve of the performance of the corporation or of man-
agement's use of corporate assets, they can sell their shares in
the market, investing the sales proceeds in other corpora-
tions. 2 99 Because the shareholder "[r]egards himself . . .not
as a citizen of a corporate state but as an investor. . . seeking a
financial return,"300 the so-called "Wall Street rule" should gov-
ern. 301 Unfettered markets, not corporation law, protect share-
holders most effectively.
Closely aligned to the market model is the stance many in
the business community adopt. The epigram "If It Ain't Broke,
Don't Fix It"302 sums up this philosophy. Its supporters argue
that, in the United States, for-profit entities have flourished
under the corporate form, creating for the citizenry a high stan-
dard of living. There is, therefore, no reason to tamper with
shareholder protection or with corporate governance. If any-
thing, government overregulates companies through a multi-
plicity of regulatory schemes. "[T] he Securities and Exchange
Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, the National La-
bor Relations Board, the Environmental Protection Agency,
and literally hundreds of others are present at every board
298. Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent De-
velopments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U.L REv. 913, 944 (1982).
299. Widespread selling, in turn, leaves management vulnerable to being
ousted by tender offer. See, e.g., Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate
Contro4 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965). More recently, however, the market for
corporate control has occasionally gone amuck. With white and gray knights,
bear hug offers, golden parachutes, defensive lockups, and the rest, the market
for corporate control may have turned into a stomach-churning repellent for
many shareholders and would-be investors. Cf. Pac-Man Economics, Wall St.
J., Sept. 27, 1982, at 22, col. 1.
300. Werner, supra note 281, at 1644. See also id. at 1649-53 (summarizing
other viewpoints).
301. The rule that if shareowners are not pleased they should sell has been
prominent in the literature since at least the early 1970s. See, e.g., Hethering-
ton, Fact and Legal Theory: Shareholders, Managers, and Corporate Social Re-
sponsibility, 21 STAN. L. REv. 248, 253 (1969). Cf. B. LONGSTRETH & H.
ROSENBLOOM, CORPORATE SociAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE INSTITUTIONAL INvES-
TOR 46-64 (1972).
302. Marsh, "If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It " in COMMENTA rES, supra note
203, at 293. See also Ruder, Present Law Strikes the Right Balance, id. at 227.
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meeting."303 The Revised Model Business Corporation Act,
with flexibility as its only goal, best typifies this philosophy of
corporation law.3O4
Both the economics and, more indirectly, flexibility schools
ignore the third logical alternative. Shareholders need not re-
main as "citizens of a corporate state"; investors selling in the
market need not reinvest in other companies. Instead, individ-
uals can sell their shares and simply not return to the market
or otherwise reinvest. Investors can use the share sale pro-
ceeds to purchase durable goods, luxury items, or otherwise to
consume. Both the economics group and the business com-
munity flexibility school fail to note long term trends that may
indicate existence of a malaise. They instead focus on narrow
studies in order to justify a priori conclusions. Since stock
prices do not fall when corporations reincorporate in Delaware,
there must be nothing wrong with liberal or enabling corpora-
tion law.305
In 1972 individual investment, as measured by the number
of individuals owning publicly traded stocks, declined for the
first time since the New York Stock Exchange began keeping
statistics in 1951.306 Share ownership peaked in 1970 with one
in four adults owning publicly traded shares. In subsequent
years, the incidence of share ownership has stayed well below
that figure. 307 Only in 1981 did the absolute number of individ-
uals owning shares rise to the level it had reached in 1970.308
At the same time, the needs to modernize increasingly outmo-
ded industrial plants, expand capital-intensive modern ven-
tures, and compete in an international or global economy
indicate that industry will require vastly greater amounts of
capital in years ahead.309
303. Marsh, supra note 302, at 295.
304. See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
305. See, e.g., Fischel, supra note 298, at 920-21 (reviewing Dodd & Leftwich,
The Market for Corporate Charters: "Unhealthy Competition" versus Federal
Regulation, 53 J. Bus. 259 (1980)).
306. Wall St. J., Mar. 28, 1973, at 1, col. 6 (decline from 32.5 million in 1971 to
31.7 million in 1972). Public share ownership then stayed flat throughout the
decade, with 32.2 million individuals owning stocks in 1981. NEW YORK STOCK
EXCHANGE, 1981 S1 EOWNERSHIP 1 (1982).
307. 1982 NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE FACT BOOK 47 (one in four in 1970;
one in six in 1975; one in five in 1980 and 1981).
308. NEW YoRK STOCK EXCHANGE, 1981 SHAREOWNERSHIP 1 (1982).
309. For an early description of the problems, see Solomon & Belzer, Look-
ing Ahead:- Capital Shortages, Tax Policy & Economic Planning, 51 NOTRE
DAmE LAW. 251, 252-55 (1975). See also B. BOSWORTH, J. DUESENBERRY & A. CAR-
RON, CAPIrrAL NEEDS IN THE SEVENTIES (Brookings Inst. 1975).
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The suggestion that the current state of corporation law
has contributed to the declining number of investors is admit-
tedly pure conjecture. Ravages of inflation, better returns in
competing non-equity investments, securities regulation with
overzealous protection of the individual investor,310 double tax-
ation of dividends, growth of pension plans as substitutes for
personal portfolios, and the sorry performance of equity invest-
ments over the last decade are all interrelated causes of a de-
cline in the investor population. Decline in the number of
investors leads, in turn, to a reduced rate of growth in the de-
mand for equities, thus starting a downward spiral. Investment
performance remains lackluster or worsens.
Yet as perhaps reflected in corporation law's failure to foil
defenses to cash tender offers, golden parachutes, or excessive
management perquisites, 3 11 the operation of corporation law
may well play a role in producing malaise among investors. It
cannot with any certainty be said, as law and economics com-
mentators have said, that "not one shred of empirical evidence"
supports the view that there exists a "widespread perception
that there is something wrong."312 In great number, investors
have voted with their feet. Moreover, corporation law may fa-
cilitate certain forms of management conduct which, in turn,
may lead to a perception by investors that something is wrong.
At a minimum, the marginal cost of changes to, and strengthen-
ing certain areas of, corporation law may be exceeded by the
marginal revenue that resulting increased investment and more
stable share ownership represents.
In order to maintain credibility, law teachers, regulators,
business executives, and others imbued with the philosophy of
the law and economics and flexibility schools must delve into
the thornier macroeconomic issues, such as the proper balance
310. See, e.g., Branson, Securities Regulation After Entering The Competitive
Era: The Securities Industry, SEC Policy, and The Individual Investor, 75 Nw.
U.L. REV. 857, 900-13 (1980). See also R. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION:
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION VERSUS CORPORATE AMERICA
(1982).
311. See supra notes 286-91 and accompanying text. See also 14 FED. SEC.
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1096 (June 18, 1982) (survey of 1100 corporations by
Touche Ross & Co. and National Association of Corporate Directors).
312. Fischel, supra note 298, at 914. See also Hetherington, When the Sleeper
Wakes: Reflections on Corporate Governance and Shareholder Rights, 8 HoF-
STRA L. REV. 183, 187 (1979): "As long as management maintains and increases
the firm's profitability, shareholders are likely to feel that they are getting what
they came for. This attitude is surely the primary reason why ... there has
been no serious protest by those whose interests are directly involved." (cita-
tions omitted).
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between consumption, on the one hand, and savings and in-
vestment, on the other. In the area of corporation law it may
not be true, only convenient, to assume that there is "little in
[macroeconomic issues] that could ever impact significantly on
law or legal philosophy."313 There are problems in the corpo-
rate sector. over the longer term investment has lagged, needs
for equity investment increase on an almost Malthusian basis,
and reformers of the free market or other persuasions seem
blissfully unaware of either development.
B. THE CORPORATE SocIAL RESPONSIBILITY SCHOOL
Proponents of corporate social responsibility reforms seem
equally unaware of a possible fundamental malaise. Without
inquiry into whether the underlying economic structure is
healthy, these reformers adopt a position opposite that which
the free market and flexibility schools advocate. Through cor-
poration law, they would establish responsibilities toward con-
sumers, workers, the communities in which corporations
operate, and clean air and water.3 14 Social responsibility re-
formers would also discard the traditional corporation law
model with its central theme, regulation for the protection of
shareholders. Since modern shareholders are only "gamblers
in the stock market" lottery,3 1 5 their interests are peripheral at
best. If shareholders do not think corporate social responsibil-
ity activity is in their best interest, their choice is clear. They
too can sell, just as shareholders in the law and economics
school can sell if they are not pleased with developments under
a laissez-faire model.3 16
The social responsibility philosophy seeks to journey to a
point miles beyond corporation law's present site. By legisla-
tive fiat imposing revolutionary responsibilities upon corpora-
tions, the social responsibility reformers seek to travel that
journey's last miles without first taking the initial steps. With-
out great numbers of investors and shareholders, the financial
as well as sociopolitical footing of the corporate state may be
313. Manne, The Marriage of Law and Economics, LEXECON, Summer 1982,
at 1, 4.
314. See, e.g., Henning, supra note 275, at 924 ("palpable evidence of corpo-
rate irresponsibility in our air, water, and food, on our highways, railroads and
television sets, and in our sacked and gradually abandoned cities" makes such
corporation law reform necessary). See generally Nader, supra note 275.
315. Flynn, Corporate Democracy: Nice Work If You Can Get I, in CoRPO-
RATE POWER n AMERICA, supra note 275, at 105.
316. See supra notes 298-304 and accompanying text.
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weak. Corporations would not be able to provide society with
the desired level of goods and services, let alone be able to ful-
fill new or expanded social responsibilities. Investors and
shareholders, as well as consumers, are a necessary first predi-
cate to any but the most radical reform that can be proposed.3 17
C. "Buzz WORD" PHILOSOPHIES FOR CORPORATION LAw
Neither market model nor social responsibility schools
have the upper hand, although corporate social responsibility
reformers did have the momentum until several years ago. The
introduction and failure of federal chartering in successive
Congresses marked a high water point for social responsibility
reform.3 18
To a degree, though, Corporate Governance has supplanted
federal chartering as the standard bearer for the corporate so-
cial responsibility movement, albeit with a muted and more re-
sponsible tone. Indeed, the first substantive section of
Corporate Governance speaks to these issues:
Corporate law should provide that the objective of the business corpo-
ration is to conduct business activities with a view to corporate profit
and shareholder gain, except that, even if corporate profit and share-
holder gain are not thereby enhanced, the corporation, in the conduct
of its business
(b) may properly take into account ethical principles that are
generally recognized as relevant to the conduct of business, and
(c) may devote resources, within reasonable limits, to public wel-
fare, humanitarian, educational, and philanthropic purposes.3 19
Corporate Governance apparently seeks to make corpora-
tions "accountable." Beyond statements such as those in the
first section, however, Corporate Governance never articulates
whether accountability is to shareholders, the society, or clean
air and water, and why this accountability is necessary. To
achieve the governance goals, shareholders elect an independ-
ent board that supervises management by means of auditing
and compensation committees. Whether shareholders or direc-
tors desire to-or will-govern, and why the drafters selected
317. Share ownership would not, of course, be necessary if reform took the
form of nationalization. See, e.g., J. K. GALBRArr, ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC
PuRPosE (1973); Shepard, Public Enterprise, in CORPORATE POWER IN AMERICA,
supra note 275, at 235.
318. See, e.g., Hearings on Corporate Rights and Responsibilities before the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
319. CoRPoRATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 3, § 2.01. See also Comment, Cor-
porate Ethics and Corporate Governance: A Critique of the ALI Statement on
Corporate Governance Section 2.01(b), 71 CALm'. IL REV. 994 (1983).
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"governance" as the route to "accountability," is at best incho-
ate in current thought. In both "accountability" and "govern-
ance," there seems to be included a notion of limiting
managers' power. Yet the drafters never bring to the fore rea-
sons why law must limit managers' power.
By and large, Corporate Governance steers a middle
course, responsibly attempting to evolve a new but not radi-
cally different corporation law model. The difficulties arise be-
cause the document does not clearly and simply define the
ends it seeks in terms capable of being kept constantly in sight.
Instead, "accountability" and "governance" become at best am-
biguous and at worst meaningless ends. With no simply de-
fined goal, neither critics nor supporters can judge whether a
particular measure-a new structure or process, a substantive
command or prohibition, or increased flexibility buttressed by
general principle-firmly grasps the nettle. Beyond a vague
discomfort with the present scheme, the reformers do not even
know what the nettle is.
Similar to "accountability" and "governance" is the goal of
"legitimacy."320 With limited use, Professor Hurst's construct
may have meaning. With repeated use, legitimacy comes to
have no meaning or to mean "many things."
It is employed, as it was by Hurst in 1970, to embrace the criteria of
utility and responsibility, or to include both criteria but with a different
reading of the sources, or to refer only to the responsibility criterion. It
is used without restriction, as in references to legitimating the role of
the corporation in American life, or to making the corporation accepta-
ble to the American people, or to indicating the corporation's failure to
meet the public's perception of its responsibilities. 3 2 1
Despite this broad, amorphous meaning, reformers add "legiti-
macy" to "accountability" and to "governance" in forming a tri-
umvirate of goals for corporation law reform.322
Corporate Governance is not alone. In revising the MBCA,
the ABA Committee on Corporate Laws sails on toward "flexi-
bility" with no thought of whether problems exist or of pre-
cisely why they are engaged in the exercise.323 The British
amend company law on an extensive basis, returning to greater
substantive regulation. They seem, however, to act only in re-
320. The phrase is best known from its use in J. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF
THE BusINEss CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF UNTrED STATES, 1780-1970 (1970).
321. Werner, supra note 281, at 1647-48 (citations omitted).
322. See, e.g., COMMENTARiES, supra note 203, at 41, 46, 51, 52, 133, 136, 138,
139, 249, 272, 273, 327.
323. The reformers have, perhaps, given thought to the increased flexibility
that will make some aspects of practice less worrisome for corporate counsel.
See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
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sponse to the Council of the European Economic Community
and its directives on company law, and not in light of any un-
derlying normative philosophy.324
Reformers need a perception of the particular problems
that exist with corporation law today. From the precise articu-
lation of problems should come a formulation of goals for cor-
poration law reform. These goals must be stated cogently so
that through the discussion and drafting stages of any reform
process, discussants and drafters can easily bring the central
goal to mind. A simple, understandable statement must sup-
plant "governance," "accountability," "legitimacy," or "flexibil-
ity" as a lodestar for corporation law reform.
D. SHIFTING FROM A PROPERTY TO A PoUcY BASED MODEL
Shareholder protection has been the traditional goal of cor-
poration law.32s Corporation law protected shareholders from
conversion or waste of their property by corporate managers,
controlling shareholders, and, on occasion, third parties such as
rapacious "corporate looters."326 Thus conceived, the regula-
tory model protected property. Through the shareholder vote
and other facets of corporate democracy, corporation law also
gave shareholders a measure of ability to protect themselves. 327
At many points, though, the rule of law still stood sentry duty
for when corporate democracy might fail. The obligation of ma-
jority to minority shareholders, preemptive rights doctrines, or
statutory provision for dissolution in cases of deadlock or op-
pression might intervene to protect the shareholder's property
when majority rule had produced a warped or unjust result.32 8
Viewed as based upon a property model, corporation law
324. See, e.g., L.C.B. GOwER, supra note 5, at 81-88; Schmitthoff, The Impact
of European Community Law on English Law, 8 MANITOBA I J. 461 (1977);
Tunc, A French Lawyer Looks at American Corporation Law and Securities
Regulation, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 757, 768 (1982) (British and French reaction to
EEC directives).
325. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
326. See, e.g., DeBaun v. First Western Bank and Trust Co., 46 Cal. App. 3d
686, 120 Cal. Rptr 354 (1975) (sale to corporate looter).
327. See, e.g., A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 123-26 (rev. ed. 1967).
328. See, e.g., Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947) (obliga-
tion of majority shareholders); Jones v. H. F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 81
Cal. Rptr. 592, 460 P.2d 464 (1969) (same); Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co.,
20 Ill. 2d 208, 170 N.E.2d 131 (1960) (oppression); supra note 286 (preemptive
right). Although federal proxy rule regulation has largely preempted the field,
state law also can intervene to insure that some integrity exists in the demo-
cratic process itself. See, e.g., Brown v. Ward, 593 P.2d 247 (Alaska 1979) (spirit
of federal proxy rules applicable as matter of state corporation law); Campbell
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functionally resembles the law of torts or contracts. The law
protects property in order to elevate the resolution of disputes
from the streets to the more intellectual, orderly plane of law
office and courtroom. Consequently, self-help and resultant vi-
olence will not undermine the social fabric.329 Because corpo-
ration law protects a pecuniary interest, not a physical interest
or one otherwise closely connected to the person, the law
sometimes moved more slowly to protect the property interest
in the corporation. 330 Yet the law did move.
What is curious, however, is that in its sometimes slow
movement, corporation law never advanced beyond the goals of
long ago. Indeed, corporation law has receded even from that
model. Fifty years ago Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means
demonstrated that insofar as shareholder democracy was an in-
gredient in the protection of property, the protection might not
exist. More often than not those who control a corporation do
not own it.331 Through efficient capital markets and modem
communications, share ownership had become so dispersed
that, almost by default, a small group with little or no owner-
ship could control the property.33 2 Anomalously, unlike tort
and contract models, the corporation law model for protection
of property had less validity when Berle and Means wrote than
it had had in the nineteenth century.333
For fifty years, corporation law has had a well-known pe-
nultimate goal-shareholder control through a der-mocratic pro-
cess-which works imperfectly at best. The ultimate goal,
protection of property, has not evolved beyond what it was a
v. Loews, Inc., 36 Del. Ch. 563, 134 A.2d 852 (Del. 1957) (certain due process
minimums for corporate elections, as a matter of state law).
329. See, e.g., Anderson v. Gouldberg, 51 Minn. 294, 296, 53 N.W. 636, 637
(1892) (Mitchell, J.) (remedy at law discourages "unlawful seizures" and "re-
prisals"); A. BERLE, STUDiES IN THE LAW OF CORPORATION FINANCE 26-40 (1928)
(corporation law has similar purpose).
330. Compare Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 174
N.E. 441 (1931) ("assault upon the citadel of privity" rejected when only pecuni-
ary loss involved) with MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E.
1050 (1916) (no privity required when "life and limb in peril"). Compare also
Le Lievre & Dennes v. Gould [1893] 1 Q.B. 491 (no redress for pecuniary loss
suffered as a result of a misrepresentation negligently made) with Hedley
Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners [1964] A.C. 465 (liability for negligence ex-
tended to pecuniary loss; also extended to third parties even though short of
privity if "special relationship" exists).
331. A. BERLE & G. MEANs, supra note 327, at 47-116.
332. Id.
333. But see Werner, supra note 281, at 1612-29 (shareholder democracy and
its subsequent erosion are "part of the folklore of big corporations"; traditional
view of shareholder control based upon a "Garden of Eden" perspective).
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century or more ago. Surely after all that time corporation law
can move beyond those anachronistic ends. Corporation law
should protect property not just to prevent self-help or promote
shareholder democracy, but also to increase confidence in an
economic system which rests heavily on savings and
investment.
In corporation law, a shift in emphasis from shareholder
protection, that is, protecting property, to protecting investment
is a subtle but important change. The corporate sector is not
well, as the indifference of investors to the marketplace indi-
cates.33 Over the last decade or more, a certain malaise seems
to have crept into investment and shareownership processes.
Would-be corporation law reformers must determine the extent
and, within the ambit of corporation law, the possible causes of
that disaffection. Reform should address those causes in order
to protect and even encourage share ownership. On the other
hand, corporation law cannot embody policy based upon the
Wall Street or similar cynical decision rules. Such policies,
which concentrate on microeconomic analysis yet overlook
macroeconomic needs, could have disasterous consequences.3 35
At the same time, restoration of confidence in the corporate
sphere and in share ownership is a necessary prerequisite to
any thought about establishing new or different responsibilities
under the guise of corporation law.
V. CONCLUSION
Much like federal securities law, corporation law should
adopt the goal of shareholder protection not just in the sense of
protecting property but also with a view toward restoring integ-
rity to and belief in the investment process. Unlike federal se-
curities law, corporation law must tend toward promoting share
ownership. Often investors and shareholders are best pro-
334. See supra notes 306-09 and accompanying text. For a slightly differing
view, see Hayes & Abernathy, Managing Our Way to Economic Decline, HAv.
Bus. REv. June-July 1980, at 67.
335. Cf. Sealey, A Reply to Professor Kripke: The Negative, Not the Positive,
Is the Real Issue of Corporate Governance, 36 Bus. LAw. 1655, 1656 (1981):
The Wall Street Rule ... has very practical consequences.. . . When
selling their interests is the primary means to express dissatisfaction,
shareholders are put into a frame of mind that the only practical way
to communicate ... is through the markets. Patience, direct communi-
cation, loyalty and constructive criticism are given short shrift ....
On a lesser scale, in and out philosophies are simply ill-suited for many inves-
tors who prefer stable, controlled growth. See, e.g., R. WEST & S. TINC, THE Ec-
ONOMICS OF THE STOCK MARKET 5-8 (1971) (characteristics of an efficient
market).
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tected not by ubiquitous regulation but by the existence of
great numbers of shareholders and investors in the markets.
The liquidity, lack of stock price gyration, and controlled
growth thus generated may protect better than any
regulation. 36
At other times, substantive regulation may be the best
means to restore integrity to and belief in the investment pro-
cess. Statutory do's and don'ts directed against real, as op-
posed to hypothetical, abuse may best curb conduct by
corporate managers or owners that has inimical effects on
shareholders' and investors' perceptions. 337 Some emphasis on
corporate structure, perhaps including some form of independ-
ent directors or other corporate governance proposals, may also
aid in achieving the policy goal in other areas. Last of all, flex-
ibility for corporate managers may be entirely appropriate in
some, but not across all, areas of corporation law.338
What is clear from the three major trends in corporation
law today is that little thought has been given to what aims
those movements seek, or why the participants are about the
reform or revision process in the first place. Ephemeral con-
structs abound, including "accountability," "legitimacy," and
"social responsibility." Few sideway glances have been cast,
save for an occasional short pejorative burst one reform group
aims at another. Little comparative, and no empirical, research
has taken place. Now that corporation law has awakened,
seemingly with a jump and a start, it must reaccess its course
and in a systematic manner begin anew the process of reform,
restatement, and revision.
336. See, e.g., id. at 56-60.
337. Even market model advocates have conceded that regulation other
than market forces may be necessary in certain areas. See Winter, State Law,
Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUDiEs
251, 274-84 (1977).
338. Although corporation law may be largely constitutional law, see M. A.
EISENBERG, supra note 215, constitutional law does more than merely overlay
structure and process on an association of individuals. Constitutions also im-
pose categorical imperatives on governments and citizens alike. Also, in reality
corporation law has always been a meld of agency, torts, contract, and trust, as
well as constitutional principles. A multiplicity of approaches for dealing with
corporation law's various aspects may then be far more realistic than treating
corporation law as a unified whole.
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